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Abstract 
 
This is a paper about legislative package deals in the European Union and their effects on 
EU policy outcomes. It analyzes inter-chamber legislative exchange between the Council 
of Ministers and the European Parliament. The key argument is that package deals increase 
the legislative influence of the European Parliament across legislative procedures and 
policy areas. Package deals allow Member States to establish control over the financial 
aspects of legislation and to ensure its adoption without delay. In exchange, the European 
Parliament gains further institutional powers and access to some of the EU’s most salient 
policy areas. The argument is tested empirically through the quantitative analysis of 1465 
co-decision and consultation proposals, 19 policy areas and 8 years. The results indicate 
that the use of package deals in the EU is conditional on the distributive nature of 
legislative proposals, and their urgency. In turn, package deals extend the EP’s legislative 
influence in distributive policy areas and increase its institutional powers.  1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the conditions for the use of legislative package deals in European 
Union decision-making. It analyses the effects of inter-chamber logrolling on the 
legislative influence of the European Parliament across policy areas and across time. The 
possibility of logrolling between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers has 
attracted little theoretical attention and no empirical testing. The paper offers a theory of 
inter-chamber package deals in the European Union. The arguments are tested through the 
examination of 2369 issues contested by the European Parliament in 1465 co-decision and 
consultation proposals, falling in 19 EU policy areas and completed in the period 1 May 
1999 – 30 April 2007. 
  The paper argues that there are two conditions for the use of package deals in the 
EU legislature: the distributive nature of legislative proposals, and their urgency. The key 
point is that package deals allow Member States to establish control over the budgetary 
aspects of legislation and to ensure its speedy adoption. In exchange for allowing Member 
States to realize their budgetary and policy preferences, the EP gains further institutional 
powers in the EU’s distributive policy areas. Moreover, package deals increase the 
legislative influence of the European Parliament in distributive policy areas. When it comes 
to funding and budgetary matters, Member States are less open to negotiations. However, 
through package deals the EP gains access and legislative presence in policy areas from 
which it has traditionally been excluded.  
  The theory borrows from existing theories of logrolling developed in a single-
chamber context and extends the argument to the bicameral context of the EU legislature.  
In contrast to existing procedural spatial models of EU decision-making, the paper views 
EU law-making as a repeat-play process, where interdependent actors with different 
preference intensities choose to commit to and enforce informal package deals and hence 
overcome gridlock.  2 
 
Existing procedural models of EU legislative politics have largely neglected the 
importance of informal rules and the possibility of logrolling and package deals in the 
decision-making process. Most spatial models of EU decision-making view lawmaking as a 
process of single-shot interactions between the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission. They ignore the possibility of repeated interactions between the institutional 
actors and eliminate the idea of different preference intensities and logrolling in the EU 
legislative context (Tsebelis, 1994; Steunenberg, 1994; Crombez, 1996; Garrett and 
Tsebelis, 1996; Tsebelis, 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000).  
The idea of logrolling has occupied a central place in the literature of legislative 
politics and theories of exchange have been most prominent in the literature of US 
legislative decision-making (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, 2004; Coleman, 1966, 1990; 
Ferejohn, 1986; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; 
Stratmann, 1992; 1995; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1998; Krutz 2001). Analyses of logrolling 
take into account the informal interactions among institutional actors as well as formal 
legislative procedures. The definition of logrolling varies between the studies but overall, it 
is understood as ‘the exchange of loss in some issues for benefits in others resulting in 
mutual overall gain between actors with different interests...’ (Mueller, 1989).  
In contrast, ideas of gains from legislative exchange in the EU context have 
received little attention, limited theoretical focus and no empirical testing. Recently, several 
theoretical models, implying logrolling have been developed in the EU decision-making 
literature (Stokman and Van Oosten, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita, 1994; Crombez, 2000; 
Konig and Proksch, 2006). These authors acknowledge that EU decision-making presents 
legislators with multiple issues for consideration and that their repeated interactions in the 
EU legislative process create opportunities for logrolling and exchange of support. 
Nevertheless, there exist no empirical tests of whether legislative exchange is a significant 
process in EU decision-making.  3 
 
SECTION I: WHY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE DEALS IN THE EU 
Package deals are fragile informal bargains agreed between representatives of the 
Parliament and the Council. Legislative proposals and the issues included in packages are 
discussed and voted as a whole
1. Usually agreed through informal negotiations, these 
legislative compromises serve as binding commitments and each of the legislative 
chambers has to accept such deals without any further amendment. Package deals allow the 
linkage of issues and proposals and their simultaneous decision by EU legislators. Issues 
are not decided on a case-by-case basis, but are linked to one another. Decisions on one 
issue are connected to decisions on another issue.  
Lawmaking through package deals allows the exchange of support between the 
Parliament and the Council across different types of issues to which the EU legislative 
chambers attach different preference intensities. Package deals allow the legislative bodies 
to obtain their most preferred outcomes by exchanging support on some issues for support 
on other issues. The distributive nature of EU legislation and the timing of legislative 
action induce the use of package deals. Logrolling allows some of the most controversial 
proposals that would otherwise face gridlock, to be successfully negotiated and passed. The 
bicameral EU legislative structure does not allow Member States to avoid the opinion of 
the European Parliament or to proceed without the EP’s consent. This interdependence 
necessitates close cooperation between the legislative bodies. Package deals help the 
legislative chambers to resolve conflict and to reduce the costs of collective action.  
If there are no opportunities for legislative exchange, the Member States and the 
European Parliament negotiate legislative proposals on a case-by-case basis and the issues 
involved in these proposals are discussed one at a time. In such cases, no linkage of issues 
                                                 
1 The origins of the package deal in the European Union can be traced back to the development of the 
budgetary procedure and the involvement of the European Parliament in the approval of the EU budget 
since 1970. The EU budget is the result of intense negotiations resulting in logrolling and package deals. 
The first official mentioning of a budgetary package can be linked to the Delors I package of 1987. The 
establishment of the internal market was linked to the budgetary package and several issues were linked 
together (Laffan, 1997, 62-70). 4 
 
or proposals takes place. When package deals are not possible, EU lawmaking follows the 
procedural route of decision-making, outlined by the treaties. 
Due to the bicameral nature of the EU legislature, inter-chamber package deals 
serve two purposes: a) resolving conflict between the legislative chambers and b) reducing 
the costs associated with common action. First, the use of legislative package deals in the 
EU is a solution to the problem of conflict resolution at the inter-cameral level. In 
bicameral legislatures, chambers may differ in their policy positions. The passage of a 
legislative proposal in either the EP or the Council does not constitute the end of the 
legislative process. Because different chambers can have different policy preferences, the 
inter-institutional bargaining process is crucial to legislative outcomes (Gailmard and 
Hammond, 2006, 3). Even if the two chambers are nearly identical in political alignment, 
this does not mean that legislative proposals will find identical support in both of them. 
Differences between the legislative chambers may persist to exist (Tsebelis, 2002, 144). 
Therefore, lawmaking through package deals in the EU has developed as a practical 
solution to resolving inter-chamber conflict.  
  The second reason for the sealing of package deals in the EU is the collective action 
problem. The larger the size of the group needed to take collective action, the more difficult 
it is to organize individual legislators around a common position (Olson, 1965). In order to 
facilitate the law-making process, reduce uncertainty, speed up decision-making and avoid 
gridlock, EU legislators develop informal procedures. Making the legislature work is a 
collective interest. By working closely at the very early stages of the procedures, legislators 
from the Council and the Parliament gain an idea on what goes on in the other chamber. 
Package deals hence serve as a coalition-building strategy (Evans, 2004, 31). The leaders in 
the EP and the Council work together on legislative packages and build support in each of 
their chambers around the package compromises. Package deals help each chamber 
coordinate its internal politics in order to enforce a possible inter-chamber compromise.  5 
 
The theory of inter-chamber logrolling in the EU is developed further with a discussion of 
the several assumptions made about the legislative actors, their preferences and intensities 
of preferences, their interdependence, their repeated interaction and the possibility of 
enforcing informal commitments.  
A.  The Actors in Inter-Cameral Lawmaking through Package Deals in the EU 
The analysis is concerned with logrolling between two legislative chambers: the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Most of the well-known theories of logrolling are 
about legislative exchange inside a single chamber, the US Congress. These are theories 
about logrolling at the micro intra-institutional level (Shepsle and Weingast (1987, 1994), 
Marshall and Weingast (1988), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990))
 2. The argument here 
largely rests on these theories, but it borrows from organization theory the understanding 
that organizations can establish informal agreements with other organizations (Van de Ven 
and Ferry, 1980, Doreian and Fujimoto, 2004, Lawrence et al, 2002). 
  The argument makes the simplifying assumption that there are only two actors 
interacting in the making of EU law, the Council and the Parliament. The bargaining is 
bilateral. Informal exchange takes place between two legislative chambers. Treating these 
two institutions as unitary actors can be problematic for many students of EU legislative 
politics. Authors who have studied intra-institutional decision-making in the Council 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997, 2006; Fouilleux et al., 2005; Haege, 2008)
3 and the 
European Parliament (Hix et al., 2007; Benedetto, 2005; McElroy 2006, 2007)
4 rightly 
point out that each of the legislative institutions is a collection of actors. Divisions among 
these actors are central to legislative politics and treating the EP and the Council as unitary 
actors can undermine the explanatory power of models (Hoyland and Hagemann, 2007).  
                                                 
2 Exceptions to this rule are several more recent studies by Gailmard and Hammond (2006), Diermeier 
and Myerson (1999) and Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting (2003). These authors acknowledge the 
limitations of intra-chamber analyses of logrolling and take into account the effects of multi-chamber 
bargaining.  
3 see also Lewis, 2000; Bostock, 2002; Tallberg, 2003; and Warntjen, 2008. 
4 see also Kaeding, 2004, 2005; Hoyland, 2006; Noury and Roland, 2002; Bowler and Farrell, 1995; and 
Whitaker, 2005.  6 
 
  However, in the study of package deals, there is a good reason for treating the EP 
and the Council as unitary actors. When it comes to inter-cameral decision-making, 
compromise depends on the consent of the EP and the Council. Although there are many 
important actors within the legislative institutions, at the inter-institutional stage, the 
representatives of the EP and the Council bargain on behalf of their institutions. Any 
agreements reached informally are then binding on their parent chambers.  
B.  Intensities of Preferences 
A key assumption of the theory is that actors can feel differently about policy outcomes. 
Therefore, the saliency they attach to legislative proposals and the issues within them can 
vary. The Council and the Parliament often disagree about the content of legislation. The 
assumption that actors can have different preference intensities is at the core of the most 
well-known theories of logrolling (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 2004; Coleman 1966, 
1990; Ferejohn, 1986; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 
1994; Stratmann, 1992, 1995, 1997; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1998). Package deals cannot be 
profitable to legislative institutions if the actors attach the same saliency to proposals. If 
there are multiple issues, the two actors may value policy change on each issue differently.  
  Member States in the Council are assumed to be more concerned about the financial 
matters in EU legislation. Governments are directly affected by the budgetary aspects of 
legislative proposals. The possibility of controlling the extent to which EU legislation 
affects governments’ budgets, motivates the Council to engage in legislative trade with the 
EP. Issues of funding or budgetary contributions are therefore assumed to be much more 
salient for the Council than for the Parliament. On the other hand, the EP, as the ‘voice of 
the people’, is assumed to attach higher priorities to issues of human rights, transparency, 
privacy, and data protection. If all intensities of preferences are identical over all issues, no 
trading of support is possible. In this case, the EP and the Council will never rationally 
agree to exchange their support for reciprocal favours.    7 
 
C.  Interdependence and Repeat - Play  
Moreover, the Council and the EP are assumed to be interdependent in the framework of 
the EU legislative system. The Parliament cannot avoid the Council and vice versa. This 
interdependence creates pressures for cooperation. The EU legislative actors are affected by 
each others’ actions and seek ways for reaching compromise. The assumption of 
interdependence is also found at the core of logrolling theories (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962; Coleman, 1966; Enelow, 1986; Bernholz, 1978; Axelrod, 1984; Kroszner and 
Stratmann, 1998). Cooperation is expected to emerge between interdependent actors who 
meet repeatedly. This interdependence creates the necessity to coordinate inter-institutional 
decision-making in order to sustain an efficient EU legislative process.  
  The two legislative chambers are assumed to participate repeatedly in EU law-
making. The choices made in the present may influence legislative outcomes in the future. 
Repeat-play fosters cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). Due to repeat-play, when making 
decisions, actors take into account any reputations developed in the past as well as the 
possibility of future interactions. Legislative decisions on issues discussed repeatedly may 
be very different to decisions taken on a case-by-case basis. Repeat-play fosters the 
enforcement of informal agreements as cheating may be punished in the future. Legislators 
who are interdependent and meet repeatedly, therefore, are more likely to establish the 
terms of informal interactions and enforce inter-institutional informal commitments. 
  Considering that the Council and the EP will interact on future occasions within the 
same policy framework and within other policy areas, EU negotiators are likely to accept 
an outcome different from their ideal preferences. This way, bargaining in one legislative 
procedure can be linked to negotiations in another procedure. Therefore, the formal 
separation between co-decision and consultation matters can be overcome through the 
linkage of issues and proposals in packages.  
 8 
 
D.  Enforcement of Commitments 
The legislative chambers are assumed to be able to commit to a particular informal inter-
institutional arrangement. Following Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990) and Diermeier and 
Myerson (1999) who assume the possibility of commitment to restrictive rules, this paper 
considers the case where legislative chambers can commit to agree and enforce a package 
deal. The Council and the EP can commit to enforce and sustain informal agreements. The 
representatives of each chamber have the authority and credibility to agree package deals at 
the inter-institutional level and to ensure that these are adopted by their parent chambers. 
Of course, EU legislators face the problem inherent in all informal agreements – the 
instability of informal deals.  
  Informal agreements are difficult to enforce, as actors may cheat, deny, and seek to 
amend or abolish any previous commitments (Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; 
Stratmann, 1992; Parisi, 2002). In the EU context, the problem of non-enforceability of 
informal agreements between the legislative actors is overcome with the establishment of 
an institutional structure for political exchange – the trialogue. As legislative exchange is 
only bilateral and agreed between representatives of the two chambers, informal 
commitments are much easier to enforce.  
  In a large legislature, such as the EU, knowing the policy positions and preference 
intensities of individual legislators is almost impossible, especially during the early stages 
of the legislative process. Internally, both the EP and the Council reduce the number of 
participants in drafting legislative proposals. The preparatory bodies in the Council and the 
legislative committees in the EP ensure that their members are aware of their policy 
preferences and the intensity of these preferences on different issues. Given their 
interdependence, different preference intensities, repeated interactions in the lawmaking 
process, and their ability to conclude and enforce informal commitments, EU legislators 
find it profitable to cooperate through package deals. 9 
 
Modelling Legislative Package Deals in EU Decision-Making  
The legislative inter-chamber exchange process can be described with an Edgeworth Box 
(see Figure 1.1). Actors A and B are the Council and the Parliament. Goods 1 and 2 are two 
different types of issues, say, Institutional Powers and Budgetary Issues. Gains from 
exchange are possible in the following scenario. Actor A, the Council, in the low left-hand 
corner, holds preferences X¹a over Institutional Powers Issues and X²a over Budgetary 
Issues. Actor B, the Parliament holds preferences X¹b over Institutional Powers Issues and 
X²b over Budgetary Issues. The indifference curves of the Council and the EP are drawn 
through Y. The shaded area represents all points where exchange between the EP and the 
Council will lead to mutual gains.  
Figure 1.1 Inter-Chamber Legislative Exchange in the European Union  
 
In order to gain in budgetary issues and to move from Y to M, the Council will have 
to give up [X¹a - Y¹a] in Institutional Power Issues and it will acquire in exchange [X²a - 
Y²a] in Budgetary Issues. In exchange, the Parliament gives up [X²b - Y²b] in Budgetary 
Issues, but it gains [X¹b - Y²b] in Institutional Powers. Given their different intensities of 
preferences over these two different types of issues, the two legislative chambers in the EU 
can engage in trade and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.  10 
 
A.  Where Do Legislative Package Deals Originate in the EU? 
This theory of inter-chamber logrolling applies to package deals within proposals and 
package deals across proposals. Furthermore, package deals are expected to be enforced 
when issues and proposals are discussed simultaneously. 
  One way of concluding a package deal is through a logroll on a single proposal, in 
which the two actors attach different saliencies to the multiple issues involved in the 
legislative act. A package deal on a single ‘omnibus’ proposal ensures that the legislation 
passes within each chamber and that it respects the priorities of the EP and the Council. 
Another way of concluding a legislative package deal is through a logroll on multiple 
proposals. The two actors attach different saliencies to the multiple issues involved in the 
legislative acts, but an agreement is only possible if the two or more legislative proposals 
are passed together. Whether inter-chamber logrolling takes place within proposals or 
across proposals, package deals are expected to be agreed simultaneously.  
  Logrolls are likely to break if promises are made across time or policy areas. This is 
in line with the consensus in the more recent ‘gains from exchange’ literature that informal 
deals are especially vulnerable when agreed sequentially (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; 
Parisi, 2002). In the EU legislature, the EP and the Council may be represented by different 
bargaining agents in the future. Even if the bargaining agents commit to enforcing an 
informal agreement over time, the parent chambers may feel differently in future situations. 
Intra-chamber politics may lead to the inability of actors to enforce informal commitments 
over time. Therefore, legislative package deals are not expected to be agreed sequentially.  
  Legislation in the EU may become part of a package deal through two routes. These 
are packages proposed by the EP or the Council and packages proposed by the European 
Commission. First, a package deal is negotiated when any of the legislative chambers 
proposes a logroll. This can be either the EP or the Council. A package deal will occur if 
there is room for exchange between the legislative chambers. The legislative actors propose 11 
 
the bundling of issues in order to find an overall compromise, satisfying their different 
preference intensities. Second, if the Commission proposes several pieces of legislation 
simultaneously and treats them as a package, it structures the negotiations between the EP 
and the Council in a logrolling framework. By identifying that several legislative proposals 
are part of a package, and thus naming the bundle of issues and/or proposals – a package
5, 
the Commission increases its ability to affect legislative outcomes. The Commission 
includes issues that would otherwise be impossible to pass if proposed separately.  
    
B.  Who Strikes the Deals on Behalf of the Legislative Chambers? Bargaining Agents 
When inter-chamber package deals are negotiated, this does not mean that all members of 
one chamber start negotiations with all members of the opposite chamber. Informal 
agreements are conducted between representatives from each legislative chamber, who 
have the authority to negotiate an inter-chamber deal on behalf of their institutions. The EP 
and the Council are represented by their bargaining agents at the inter-cameral decision-
making stage. While there are clearer rules on who represents the European Parliament in 
conciliation committees (Rasmussen, 2005, 2008), there are no clear rules of ‘electing’ or 
‘appointing’ the EP’s representatives to package deal negotiations with the Council.  
  However, any informal agreement between the representatives of the two chambers 
has to be enforced through formal voting. Therefore, the EP is represented by people who 
have the authority and credibility to ‘sell’ the package compromise back to the plenary. 
This can be the committee rapporteur (together with any shadow rapporteurs and 
committee chairs), who is in charge of writing the legislative report and ensuring that it 
passes through the Parliament. In addition, the EP can be represented by political group 
leaders who, although not in charge of writing legislative reports, have the power to 
motivate party members to pass package compromises in plenary. The Council operates a 
                                                 
5  See for example the Energy package (2003), the Telecom package (2002), the Single Sky package 
(2001), the Railway package (2004), the SIS II package (2005)  12 
 
stricter procedure in its nomination of a representative to inter-cameral informal 
negotiations with the EP. To start informal contacts with the EP, the Council Presidency 
requires a mandate from COREPER and it is obliged to report back the results of the 
informal meetings. Usually, COREPER reviews the results and requires the responsible 
Council working party to draft a compromise text. The revised text is then referred to the 
Presidency for further negotiations. Only after it has been given a mandate from the 
Member States can the Presidency negotiate a package deal on behalf of the Council. 
 
C.  How are Legislative Package Deals Enforced in the EU?  
Trialogues serve as the institutional mechanisms for information exchange and capturing 
gains from trade in the European Union. Trialogue procedures allow the EP and the 
Council to communicate their intentions informally and to exchange information on their 
positions early in the legislative process. Repeat-play and the time constraints of the 
legislative process require the close cooperation between the EP and the Council in order to 
accommodate the preferences of both sides. Consensus is therefore sustained through 
increased communication between the EP and the Council and through the establishment of 
a stable cooperative relationship between the two legislative branches. As decision-making 
is a costly activity, it is in the interest of both institutions to reach agreement early. 
Therefore, trialogue procedures allow EU legislators to cut the costs of lawmaking. They 
provide the informal setting in which binding enforceable agreements are reached between 
representatives of the Council and the Parliament. 
  In their study of the US Congress, Weingast and Marshall (1988) find that package 
logrolls face the problem of enforcement. The general non-enforceability of logrolls limits 
the deals that can be struck among legislators as there are multiple incentives to renege on 
informal package bargains. Weingast and Marshall argue that an institutional enforcement 
mechanism is needed to ensure that informal deals are sustained. They find that the 13 
 
committee system in the US Congress serves this purpose. The committee system is a 
feasible institutional enforcement mechanism for capturing gains from trade within single 
legislative chambers. However, inter-chamber logrolling in the EU requires a different 
institutional mechanism to enforce the gains from trade.  
In the EU legislature informal trialogues serve this function. Trialogues are 
institutionalized at the inter-cameral level in order to capture the gains from trade. 
Trialogues provide the institutional structure for legislative exchange between the 
Parliament and the Council. Their informal nature allows EU legislators to exchange 
favours during the decision-making process and to negotiate acceptable to both sides deals, 
thus avoiding gridlock. Trialogues provide the institutional setting in which governments 
and MEPs overcome the distinct clashes of their ideological, political and policy 
preferences in the creation of EU legislation.  
While trialogues facilitate the enforcement of informal package deals, these 
institutional arrangements do not directly lead to a successful logroll. Trialogues provide 
the institutional framework for legislative bargaining, but the success of a package deal 
depends on the terms of agreement and the ability of the representatives of the Council and 
the EP to enforce the informal agreements within their parent chambers
6. It is not the 
participation at a trialogue that affects the legislative influence of a chamber, it is the 
package deal agreement negotiated at this trialogue that affects legislative outcomes.  
  Overall, the availability of legislative package deals in the EU helps minimize the 
costs of political bargaining. The possibility of credible commitments and their 
enforcement increases the stability of legislative outcomes. EU legislators gain utility when 
cooperating and are better off than playing against each other. Repeated interactions foster 
package deals and the development of long-term inter-chamber relationships. 
 
                                                 
6 That is why, the authors (Farrell and Heritier, 2004; Steunenberg and Selck, 2006; Haege and Kaeding, 
2007) who argue that trialogue procedures in the EU lead to increased legislative powers of either the EP 
or the Council, are wrong. 14 
 
D.   Conditions for the Use and Effects of  Legislative Package Deals in the EU 
If logrolling is profitable to each legislative institution, why is only some legislation 
decided through package deals? Two key conditions lead to the use of package deals in the 
EU: the distributive nature of legislative proposals and their urgency. 
  First, Member States are likely to be interested in discussing possible legislative 
exchange with the European Parliament if the issues have a distributive character. 
Governments feel intensely about the financial aspects of EU legislation. The prospects of 
controlling the extent to which EU legislation concerns their budgets, is a core condition 
for the Council’s decision to engage in legislative trade with the European Parliament. 
Distributive proposals are highly salient for Member States. Budget allocating proposals 
have direct consequences for Member States and the Council has greater incentives to 
negotiate compromise package deals with MEPs
7. Expensive legislative proposals are 
therefore more likely to be negotiated through logrolls as actors can trade their support in 
order to obtain their most preferred outcomes. The distributional aspect of such proposals 
leads the EP and the Council to use informal methods of decision-making in which each 
institution can gain the issues it cares about the most. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Package deals are more likely to occur when proposals are distributive. 
 
  Second, time is increasingly valued in the EU legislature. A sluggish EU legislative 
process can impede the ability of governments to act on salient national and international 
issues. Time is a precious resource for Member States and the inability of the EU 
legislature to adopt laws within set deadlines can have a damaging effect on government 
performance. As the time pressure increases, Member States have a greater interest in 
                                                 
7 However, if the Council of Ministers can take a decision on budgetary issues without the European 
Parliament’s approval, then even though the EP may propose trade again and again, nothing guarantees 
the Council’s interest in a package deal. For example, even though the same issues come up repeatedly in 
the areas of agriculture and fisheries, this does not lead to more inter-chamber logrolling in these areas.   15 
 
shaping the outputs of the EU legislature. Impatient legislators are more likely to consider 
alternative routes for cooperation in order to speed-up decisions. When time is limited, 
issues and proposals are more likely to be bundled together so that overall compromise 
could be reached.  
Package deals are likely to speed up the decision-making process and legislative 
decisions are likely to be fast-tracked. Legislators care not only about their successful input 
over the content of legislation, but also about avoiding delays in the decision-making 
process. Impatient legislators are also more likely to grant concessions to each other in 
order to avoid unnecessary delay. Urgent situations induce the use of logrolling and 
package deals serve as a practical solution to time pressure. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Package deals are more likely to occur when proposals are urgent.  
 
What is the effect of legislative package deals beyond the procedural context? Logrolling 
allows the European Parliament to gain legislative presence in the EU’s distributive policy 
areas. Contrary to the conventional understanding that the EP’s legislative influence is 
confined within regulatory policy areas (Judge et al., 1994; Burns, 2005), legislative 
package deals allow the European Parliament to influence distributive policy outcomes.  
Package deals reduce the ability of individual MEPs to participate fully in 
legislative bargaining with the Council. Logrolls are typically fast-tracked and they do not 
allow a large number of MEPs to participate, deliberate and include amendments to 
package compromise texts. Package deals also make the legislative process less transparent 
as they are usually agreed informally between a select number of representatives from the 
EP and the Council. However, package deals benefit the EP as a legislative institution. 
Through package deals, the Parliament gains legislative presence in some of the EU’s most 
expensive policy areas.  16 
 
It was argued earlier that package deals are more likely to take place on distributive 
proposals. Policy areas that involve a large proportion of distributive proposals are 
therefore more likely to be marked by package deals. Although Member States retain 
control over the financial aspects of proposals in the EU’s distributive policies, the 
Parliament gains further opportunities for legislative influence as a side payment. In 
exchange for allowing Member States control over budgetary issues in legislation, the EP 
gains increased institutional powers in distributive areas. The value added of package deals 
for the EP is its legislative presence in policy areas from which it has been traditionally 
excluded. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
influencing distributive policy areas. 
 
As package deals usually take place on distributive proposals, the stakes are very high and 
Member States are particularly interested in the budgetary terms of legislation. Budgetary 
issues are much more salient to Member States than the institutional powers they give in 
exchange to the EP. When the two chambers attach different preference intensities to 
issues, trade is possible and logrolls can be profitable for both chambers. Member States’ 
preferences are much more intense about issues such as spending, financing, and funding 
for programs and Community actions than they are about institutional issues such as the 
EP’s ability to monitor and control the establishment of new bodies, parliamentary 
scrutiny, or the writing of reports. On the other hand, MEPs value highly an increase in the 
institutional and legislative powers of their chamber. Thus:   
 
Hypothesis 4: Package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
gaining institutional powers. 17 
 
SECTION II: THE USE OF PACKAGE DEALS IN THE EU LEGISLATURE 
Around 25% of the completed EU legislation in the period between 1 May 1999 
and 30 April 2007 was decided through a package deal. Of the total 1465 legislative 
proposals, 973 proposals were amended and 244 proposals involved a package compromise 
between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
8. 72% of all package deals 
fell under the co-decision procedure (176 proposals) and around 28% of the package deals 
took place under the consultation procedure (68 proposals). In total, around 14 % of 
consultation legislation and 37% of co-decision legislation was decided through an inter-
chamber package deal. 
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of all legislative proposals completed in the 
period according to policy area, procedure, and use of package deals in the legislative 
process
 9. It confirms that package deals occur in many EU policy areas. The policy areas 
with the highest percentage of legislative proposals decided through package deals were 
Budget (60%), Research (77%), Energy and Transport (42%), and Information Society 
(41%). On the other hand, the policy areas of Fisheries (2%) and External Relations (5%) 
only rarely contain package legislation. 
  Three types of package deals can be identified in the EU legislative process
10. 
These are package deals on: a) single proposals that involve multiple issues; b) several 
proposals that are decided simultaneously within the same legislative procedure; and c) 
several proposals that are decided simultaneously across the co-decision and consultation 
procedures.  
                                                 
8 The use of package deals in the co-decision and consultation procedures was traced through the Council’s 
document register and the European Parliament’s plenary debates and summaries of sittings. A proposal was 
counted as a package proposal only if there was written evidence of a negotiated compromise package 
between the Council and the European Parliament. 
 
9 Sources: European Parliament Legislative Observatory and Council of Ministers Register of Documents. 
Own calculations. 
 
10 In the literature on the US Congress, Stratmann (1992) finds that logrolling agreements can take two forms. 
First, two issues y and w can be joined in a single proposal and be voted on as a package. This type of 
package deals are often referred to as ‘omnibus bills’ (Sinclair, 2000; Krutz, 2001). Second, the issue pairs 
can be voted upon separately, with y’s supporters voting for w and w’s supporters voting for y.  18 
 
 
Table 1.1 Package Deals in Co-decision and Consultation Legislation: 1999 - 2007 
 
      Co-decision  Consultation    
Policy Area (Commission DG)  Total 
Amended 
Amended 
Proposals 
Single 
Package 
Multi 
Package 
Package 
Proposals 
Amended 
Proposals 
Single 
Package 
Multi 
Package 
Package 
Proposals 
Total Package 
Deals 
Agriculture & Rural Development  80  7 1  2  3 (43%)  73  -  17  17 (23%)  20 (25%) 
Budget  35 9 -  5  5 (56%)  26  -  16  16 (62%)  21 (60%) 
Development  13  9 -  3  3 (33%)  4  -  -  -  3 (23%) 
Economic and Financial Affairs  30  2 -  2  2  (100%)  28 - -  -  2 (7%) 
Education and Culture  29  25 - 6  6 (24%)  4  -  1  1 (25%)  7 (24%) 
Employment and Social Affairs   38  20 1 6  7  (35%)  18 - -  - 7 (18%) 
Energy and Transport  99  93 16  26  42 (45%)  6  -  -  -  42 (42%) 
Enterprise and Industry  56  53 8  10  18 (34%)  3  -  -  -  18 (32%) 
Environment  58  50 14 6  20 (40%)  8  -  -  -  20 (34%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office  33  32 1 1  2 (6%)  1  -  -  -  2 (6%) 
External Relations  38  12 2 -  2  (23%)  26 - -  -  2 (5%) 
Fisheries  107  1 -  -  - 106  -  2  2  (2%)  2 (2%) 
General Secretariat  10  2 -  -  - 8  -  4  4  (50%)  4 (40%) 
Health and Consumer Protection  77  56 13  10  23  (41%)  21 - -  -  23 (30%) 
Information Society  22  20 5 4  9 (45%)  2  -  -  -  9 (41%) 
Internal Market and Services  47  41 12 4  16 (39%)  6  -  -  -  16 (34%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security  147  24 3 9  12 (50%)  123  -  11  11 (9%)  23 (16%) 
Research  26  7 1  3  4 (57%)  19  -  16  16 (84%)  20 (77%) 
Taxation and Customs Union  28  7 1  1  2 (29%)  21  -  1  1 (5%)  3 (11%) 
Total Legislative Proposals***  973  470 78 98  176(37%) 503  -  68  68  (14%)  244 (25%) 
 
 
  *** = 243 directives, 468 regulations, 247 decisions and 14 recommendations. 
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  First, legislative package deals are concluded between the European Parliament and 
the Council on single proposals that involve multiple controversial issues. Package deals 
allow the legislative bodies to obtain their most preferred outcomes by exchanging support 
on some issues for support on other issues, part of the same legislative proposal. Hence, 
logrolling allows some of the most controversial legislative proposals that would otherwise 
face gridlock, to be successfully negotiated. Overall, 32% of the package deals in the 
period took place on single proposals (78 proposals)
11. However, package compromises on 
single proposals only took place in the co-decision procedure.  
  Second, legislative package deals are agreed when several proposals are decided 
simultaneously either within the same legislative procedure or across the co-decision and 
consultation procedures. 68 % of the package deals involved the bundling of legislative 
proposals in packages and their simultaneous negotiation (166 proposals). Package deals on 
several proposals allow EU legislators to trade support across proposals and hence make 
compromises on legislative packages that would otherwise be difficult to pass
12.  
  Third, package deals are concluded when several proposals are decided 
simultaneously across the co-decision and consultation procedures. Table 5.1 highlighted 
that EU policy areas contain draft proposals from both legislative procedures. Hence, 
package deals can also involve proposals from the co-decision and consultation 
procedures
13.  
                                                 
11 For example, in the negotiations of the regulation on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
(2006/0033(COD)),  the “EP explained to the Chair of Coreper that it viewed the negotiations as a whole 
package and would be prepared to accept Article 2 as proposed by the Council, including the 15% in 
2(c), should the Council for its part agree to increase the rate of co-financing to 50%” Council 
Document 15696/06 Brussels, 22 November 2006).  
12 For example, during the negotiations on the Detergents regulation (2002/0216(COD), the Council 
reports: “On 8 December 2003 an informal trialogue meeting was held and a list of compromise 
amendments was drawn up… The European Parliament indicated that, should the compromise package 
be accepted by the Council, it was prepared to drop all other amendments and vote to approve the 
compromise package in January 2004…” Council Document 15894/1/03, Brussels 11 December 2003, 
on Regulation on Detergents). 
13 For example, during the negotiations on the SIS II proposals: “On 31 May 2005, the Commission 
submitted legislative proposals setting out the legal basis for SIS II: two Regulations to be adopted in co-
decision procedures and one Council Decision to be adopted by unanimity and with EP consultation. 
However, the EP has very clearly indicated that these three legislative instruments will be dealt with as a 
package” Council Document 13050/06, Brussels, 22 September 2006, on SIS II legal instruments). 20 
 
Therefore, there is evidence of both single omnibus legislation, where several issues 
are packaged in a single proposal and of multi-proposal package legislation, where several 
proposals are bundled together and decided simultaneously. It seems that in the EU single 
‘omnibus’ proposals are less popular than packages of several proposals decided 
simultaneously. ‘Omnibus’ packaging on single proposals occurred only under the co-
decision procedure (78 package proposals). Proposals were decided together in bundles 
under the co-decision and consultation procedures (166 package proposals). 
The largest number of omnibus single proposals was in the policy areas of Energy 
and Transport (16), Environment (14), Health and Consumer Protection (13) and Enterprise 
and Industry (8). The largest number of multi-proposal package legislation was in the 
policy areas of Energy and Transport (26), Agriculture (17), Research (16), and Budget 
(16). Cross-procedure packaging of proposals took place in the policy areas of Justice, 
Freedom and Security, Research, Budget, Agriculture, Education and Culture, and 
Taxation. Altogether, there were 78 proposals decided as omnibus packages in the co-
decision procedure, 98 proposals decided as part of a multi-package deal in the co-decision 
procedure and 68 multi-package proposals in the consultation procedure.       
It is difficult to trace successful package deals between the EP and the Council over 
time or across policy areas. The general non-enforceability of informal political bargains 
limits the deals that can be struck among MEPs and Member States. It is difficult to bind 
future legislative decisions in a logrolling context because informal agreements can easily 
be amended or ignored (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Weingast and Marshall, 1998). When 
agreements are only informal and take place sequentially, actors are likely to ‘misstate their 
preferences at the time an agreement is formed and to violate the agreement after it is 
made’ (Mueller, 1989, 87). In informal agreements, ‘any political agent can betray the 
original agreement and destabilize the original coalition’ (Parisi, 2002, 187). Therefore, in 
the EU context evidence of legislative exchange can easily be found when proposals are 21 
 
negotiated simultaneously, but logrolls are likely to break if promises are made across time 
or policy area
14.  
Finally, package deals are an increasingly used practice for resolving inter-chamber 
conflict in the EU. While only 21% of the legislative proposals were negotiated through a 
package deal in 2000, more than 41% of the proposals were package compromises between 
t in 2006. Therefore, logrolling between the EP and the Council is a significant process and 
package deals are increasingly employed across EU policy areas, going beyond the co-
decision procedure. What explains the use of package deals in the EU legislative process? 
If package deals benefit both the EP and the Council, why not use package deals all the 
time? 
 
2.1 Statistical Analysis of the Use of Package Deals in the EU Legislative Process 
 
Dependent Variable 
The probability of logrolling in the EU is analyzed through the examination of 973 
legislative proposals decided in the period 1999 – 2007 in the consultation and co-decision 
procedures. The dependent variable is whether a legislative proposal was decided through a 
package deal (Package Deal). This is a dichotomous variable where 1 =  a package deal on 
a proposal and 0 = no package deal. A legislative proposal was counted as a package 
proposal when there was written evidence in the Council’s document register and the EP 
plenary debates and summaries of sittings of the bundling of issues and proposals in a 
package compromise between the EP and the Council.  
 
                                                 
14 For example, the European Parliament was promised by the Council that if it supported the Council’s 
position on the co-decision Data Retention directive (2006/24/EC), the Council would work closely 
together with the EP in deciding future proposals in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security. In return 
for reaching a compromise deal by the end of 2005, the Parliament was promised a pay-off  in the 
negotiations of the VIS consultation legislation (see this paper’s case study). Nevertheless, during the 
negotiations of the Schengen proposals, the Council refused to keep any previous promises or agreements 
with the EP. 22 
 
Independent Variables  
In order to test the two propositions for the use of package deals in the EU, several 
independent variables were used in the analysis
15. The first hypothesis that package deals 
are more likely to occur on distributive proposals is tested with the categorical Legislative 
Cost Type variable. 1 = Regulatory Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal involves 
costs to be covered by private actors (and no direct costs for Member States or the EU 
budget). 2 = Distributive (EU budget) Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal involves 
the allocation of EU funding and contains a direct reference to the EU financial framework. 
3 = Distributive (Member States budgets) Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal 
involves costs to be covered by the Member States’ own budgets. 4 = Administrative 
Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal involves no or minor costs (see Table 1.2).  
 
Table 1.2 Legislative Proposals According to Policy Area and Cost Type
16 
 
Policy Area (Commission DG)  Total  Regulatory 
Proposals 
Distributive Proposals 
 
Administrative 
Proposals 
Who pays?     private actors   EU budget  Member States  no costs 
Agriculture & Rural Development  80  40   (50.0%)  25   (31.3%)  15   (18.8%)  - 
Budget  35  - 32  (91.4%)  1    (2.9%)  2  (5.7%) 
Development  13  3   (23.1%)  10 (76.9%)  -  - 
Economic and Financial Affairs  30  4   (13.3%)  19   (63.3%)  6  (20.0%)  1   (3.3%) 
Education and Culture  29  4   (13.8%)  18   (62.1%)  4   (13.8%)  3   (10.3%) 
Employment and Social Affairs   38  10   (26.3%)  7  (12.1%)  12   (31.6%)  6   (15.8%) 
Energy and Transport  99  57   (57.6%)  9   (9.1%)  24   (24.2%)  9   (9.1%) 
Enterprise and Industry  56  45   (80.4%)  9   (16.1%)  1   (1.8%)  1   (1.8%) 
Environment  58  34   (58.6%) 7    (12.1%)  11  (19.0%)  6  (10.3%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office  33  10   (30.3%)  6   (18.2%)  14   (42.4%)  3   (9.1%) 
External Relations  38 8   (21.1%)  20   (52.6%)  3   (7.9%)  7   (18.4%) 
Fisheries  107  59   (55.1%)  11  (10.3%)  31   (29.0%)  6   (5.6%) 
General Secretariat  10  1   (10.0%)  2   (20.0%)  1  (10.0%)  6   (60.0%) 
Health and Consumer Protection  77  56   (72.7%)  6   (7.8%)  12   (15.6%)  3   (3.9%) 
Information Society  22  14   (63.6%)  7   (31.8%)  -  1   (4.5%) 
Internal Market and Services  47  35   (74.5%)  7   (14.9%)  1  (2.1%)  4   (8.5%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security  147  78   (53.1%)  27   (18.4%)  27   (18.4%)  15   (10.2%) 
Research  26  2   (7.7%)  23   (88.5%)  1   (3.8%)  - 
Taxation and Customs Union  28  5  (17.9%)  6  (21.4%)  13   (46.4%)  4   (14.3%) 
                        
Total Legislative Proposals  973  465   (47.8%)  256  (26.3%)  175  (18.0%)  77   (7.9%) 
                                                 
15 see the Appendices for full coding, sources and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the 
analysis; as well as for correlations between the variables. 
16 The general idea of this typology is based on the typology developed by Lowi (1964; 1972).  
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The second hypothesis that package deals are more likely to occur on urgent 
proposals is tested with two variables. The dichotomous Urgent variable = 1 if there was a 
specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into effect and 0 otherwise. The 
dichotomous Council Impatience variable = 1 if the Council had started discussions and 
prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before the EP had done so and it = 0 if the 
Parliament had started discussions and prepared a draft legislative text earlier than the 
Council. This variable was measured by comparing the dates of the first draft texts on a 
legislative proposal held in the EP and the Council’s document registers. 
  In addition, the analysis includes several control variables to account for effects 
found in the logrolling literature. First, informal bargains are likely to be made when the 
intensity of preferences varies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Coleman, 1966, 1990). The 
effect of the intensity of preferences of the EP and the Council on the use of package deals 
is tested with two variables. First, the dichotomous Council - EP Salience Tie variable = 1 
when the EP and the Council attached equal importance to a legislative proposal and = 0 if 
otherwise. The Absolute Salience Distance variable tests whether the size of the absolute 
distance between the legislative chamber increases the likelihood of a package deal
17.  
  Moreover, package deals are likely to be dependent on the ability of political group 
leaders to ensure the required support in the legislature for the vote in favour of the 
informal legislative logrolls (Huber, 1996). The effect of the involvement of party leaders 
on the use of package deals is tested with the dichotomous Party Leaders variable. It = 1 if 
in addition to the committee rapporteur, the political group leaders in the EP participated in 
the writing of the proposal and the informal negotiations with the representatives of the 
Council and = 0 if the committee rapporteur (shadow rapporteurs and chairmen) were 
solely responsible for the writing and negotiations over a proposal.    
                                                 
17 The continuous variables EP Salience (measured by the number of EP committees involved in the 
drafting of a legislative proposal) and Council Salience (measured by the number of documents held in 
the Council document register on a legislative proposal) were standardized according to a 10 point scale 
(1 = the lowest and 10 = the highest degree of salience). 24 
 
  Thirdly, logrolling is likely to increase as the issue complexity of the policy area 
increases (Krutz 2001; Enelow, 1986). The effect of policy area issue complexity is tested 
with the continuous Policy Area Issue Complexity variable. Proposals that contain multiple 
issues are more complex and more time consuming. The variable measures the proportion 
of multi-issue legislation in a policy area, that is, proposals containing two and more issues. 
First, the number of issues contested by the EP per legislative proposal was counted. 
Second, the proportion of legislative proposals in a policy area containing two and more 
contested issues was calculated. The greater the proportion of complex proposals per policy 
area, the larger the value of the variable.  
As the dependent variable is dichotomous (Package Deal/No Package Deal), 
logistic regressions are used to examine the effect of the independent variables on the 
probability of logrolling in the EU. The 973 proposals belong to 19 policy areas and are 
spread over 8 years. Three empty multilevel models are estimated to test whether proposals 
part of the same policy area and year share a similar probability of being decided through a 
package deal (Dupont and Martensen, 2007).  
The hypothetical effects of the policy area and time levels are tested to examine 
whether the variance of the probability of a package deal is due to these contextual factors. 
The relevance of the contextual level and the improvements in the fit of the models are 
compared after including the different contexts. The results show that the use of package 
deals in EU decision-making varies across policy areas and the years 1999 – 2007. 
Accounting for the contextual effects of the policy area and time levels, Modes 4 to 8 test 
for the effects of the independent variables discussed above. The results are presented in 
Table 1.3. The coefficients of the variables, their standard errors and the odds ratios are 
reported. 25 
 
Table 1.3 Conditions for the Use of Package Deals in the European Union 
Legislative Package Deals in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: Package Deal 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3    Model 4  Model 5    Model 6  Model 7    Model 8 
  Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Odds  Ratio 
Fixed Effects                    
Cost Type (base Administrative Proposal)                    
Distributive Proposal (EU budget)  -  -  -     1.855 ***   1.823 ***     2.025 ***   2.004 ***    1.937 ***  6.939 
         (.422)  (.217)  (.485)  (.484)  (.485)   
Distributive Proposal (Member States)  -  -  -     1.012 **  .968 **     1.030 **   1.005 **     0.887 *   2.428 
         (.446)  (.445)  (.503)  (.501)  (.504)   
Regulatory Proposal (Private Actors)  -  -  -    .721  *  .686  *   .738    .714  .602  1.827 
         (.411)  (.409)  (.470)  (.468)  (.470)   
Urgent  -  -  -    .496 ***  .499 **    .400 *  .412 *    .358   1.431 
          ( .189)  ( .189)    ( .225)  ( .226)    ( .229)   
Council Impatience   -  -  -  -  -  -  -     0.857  ***   2.356 
                 ( . 2 2 6 )    
Absolute Distance Salience  -  -  -   .104  -   .095  -  -  - 
         (.064)     (.074)       
Salience Tie  -  -  -  -  -.457  **   -  -.541**    -.526** .591 
          (.184)     (.214)    (.215)   
Party Leaders Involved  -  -  -    1.255 ***  1.303 ***    1.381 ***   1.417 ***     1.417 ***   4.127 
          ( .236)  ( .233)    ( .270)  ( .267)    ( .267)   
Policy Area Issue Complexity  -  -  -    .039 ***  .039 ***    .048 ***  .048 ***    .044 ***  1.045 
         (.008)  (.008)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)   
Intercept  -1.199 ***  -1.115 ***  -1.728 ***    -5.137 ***  -4.838 ***    -6.130 ***  -5.843 ***    -5.821 ***  - 
  (.269)  (.157)  (.211)  (.679)  (.677)  (.781)  (.789)  (.771)   
Random Effects                     
Policy Area Level (std.dev.)  1.082 ***    1.686 ***     .535 **    .540 **     1.323 *  1.336 *    1.316 *  - 
  (.219)    (.219)     (.157)   (.157)     (.202)   (.203)     (.200)   
Year Level  (std.dev.)    .385***  < .001    -  -     .301   .321    < .001  - 
    (.128)  (.543)          (.275)    (.270)    (.270)   
-2 x Log Likelihood  996.323 1081.314 936.867  896.941  893.216  831.123  826.654  812.689   
Model Improvement    -  59.456    99.382 103.107    164.711 169.67    183.634   
                   
N Proposals  973 973 973    973 973    973 973    973   
N Policy Areas   19 19 19    19 19    19 19    19   
N Years   8  8  8    8  8    8  8    8    
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01                     26
Results 
The results support the argument that the probability of a legislative package deal between 
the EP and the Council increases when 1) proposals are distributive; and 2) proposals are 
urgent. In addition, the probability of package deals increases when 3) the EP-Council 
preference intensities vary, 4) the party leaders in the EP are involved in the negotiations 
and 5) the policy area issue complexity increases (see Model 8).  
First, package deals are most likely to occur on distributive proposals. When 
proposals contain a reference to the allocation of the EU budget, package deals are most 
likely to be used. Expensive proposals increase the likelihood of logrolling as legislators 
can trade their support in order to obtain their most preferred outcomes. Furthermore, 
distributive proposals have direct consequences for Member States and the Council has 
greater incentives to negotiate compromise package deals with MEPs. As package deals 
allow each of the chambers to gain the issues it cares about the most, the Council can 
secure its preferred policy outcomes on budgetary matters and in exchange could offer 
support for the EP’s issues as a side payment.   
Second, urgent proposals are more likely to be negotiated through a package deal in 
order to reduce decision-making time. The coefficient of the Council Impatience variable is 
positive and statistically significant. This indicates that package deals are more likely to 
take place when the Member States in the Council are impatient about the adoption of 
legislation. When time is limited, issues and proposals are more likely to be bundled 
together so that overall compromise could be reached. The Urgent variable loses its 
significance when Council Impatience is included in the model, although it shows some 
support for the hypothesis in the other models.  
Third, the preference distance between the EP and the Council on a legislative 
proposal increases the likelihood of a package deal. When there is a tie between the 
Parliament and the Council’s intensity of preferences, package deals are less likely to   27
occur. This is in line with the theoretical prediction that logrolling allows actors to express 
different intensities of preferences. Logrolls are more likely to occur if the EP and the 
Council can trade legislative support. When the preference intensities of the institutions are 
equal no legislative exchange can take place. As a result, the probability of a package deal 
increases when the preference intensities between the Council and the Parliament differ.  
The probability of the use of package deals in the EU legislative process increases 
with the increase in policy area issue complexity. The greater the proportion of multi-issue 
legislation in an EU policy area, the greater the likelihood of logrolling. The availability of 
multiple issues in proposals presents greater opportunities for legislative exchange between 
the EP and  the Council. This is especially the case, when the same constellations of 
multiple issues reoccur in different legislative proposals. For example, in 2003 in the area 
of Agriculture, in the reform of the CAP, identical issues came up in the legislative 
proposals on Milk, Rice, Dried fodder and Cereals (legislative proposals CNS/2003/0006, 
CNS/2003/0007, CNS/2003/0008, CNS/2003/0009, CNS/2003/0010, CNS/2003/0011). 
In addition, the likelihood of package deals increases with the involvement of party 
leaders. The political group leaders in the European Parliament serve the essential role of 
logroll facilitators. In 69% of the package deals the committee rapporteurs were members 
of either the EPP-ED or the PES, but in 90% of the cases the political group leaders 
participated in the negotiations with the Council alongside the committee rapporteurs in 
order to ensure the enforceability of the logroll deals. The informal nature of logrolls 
between requires the involvement of the political group leaders in order to ensure that the 
essential elements of the deal are preserved and supported in the EP plenary.  
Figure 1.2 plots the predicted probability of the use of package deals in the EU 
decision-making process, according to the distributive nature of legislative proposals and 
policy area issue complexity (based on Model 8). The plot illustrates the probability of 
logrolls on legislative proposals according to the costs associated with them.   28
Figure 1.2 Effect of Distributive Proposals and Policy Area Issue Complexity on the 
Probability of Logrolling in the EU  
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Source: Predicted probabilities based on Model 8 (Table 1.3) 
 
Distributive proposals that allocate EU funding are most likely to go through a 
logroll; followed by distributive proposals that involve costs to be covered by Member 
States’ budgets; followed by regulatory proposals that involve costs to be covered by 
private actors and finally package deals are least likely to take place on administrative 
proposals. The plot highlights that the probability of logrolling in the EU increases with the 
increase in policy area issue complexity. The statistical analysis of more than 1400 
legislative proposals illustrated that package deals are an important part of legislative 
decision-making in the European Union. Informal logrolls allow the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers to exchange support for their preferred policy outcomes and 
hence avoid gridlock and achieve compromise
18.  
                                                 
18 Linda  McAvan (PSE): “Labour MEPs welcome today's agreement on nutrition and health labelling of 
foods. We accept that this is a compromise package and there are some elements, particularly on 
Amendment 66, where we have reservations. We would have preferred the common position text, which 
allowed no derogations. However, the new law represents a major step forward in food labelling for 
consumers and improves the overall regulatory framework. It is on this basis that we supported the 
compromise package”, on the discussion of food labelling, Plenary Debates, 16 May 2006.     29
SECTION III: PACKAGE DEALS AND THE LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ACROSS POLICY AREAS AND TIME  
What is the overall effect, ‘the value added’, of the use of package deals in the bicameral 
decision-making process? What are the European Parliament’s gains from its participation 
in logrolling? This section studies the effect of package deals on EU legislative outcomes 
across all policy areas and over time. It tests the hypothesis that package deals increase the 
likelihood of European Parliament success in influencing distributive policy outcomes in 
the EU. The section also testes the hypothesis that package deals increase the likelihood of 
European Parliament success in gaining institutional powers.  
  This argument is tested across 2369 issues contested by the European Parliament in 
973 co-decision and consultation proposals, falling in 19 EU policy areas and completed in 
the period 1999 – 2007. The dependent variable is whether the European Parliament 
succeeded on a particular issue (EP Success). EP Success is understood as the ability of the 
Parliament to see its demands incorporated in the final legislative text. EP Success was 
coded as a binary variable where 1 = success and 0 = failure. Overall, the EP succeeded in 
51.9 % of all issues it contested in the period. The average EP success rate in the 
consultation procedure was 25.9%, whereas it was 65.2% in co-decision (see Table 1.4).  
 
Table 1.4 Success rate of issues contested by EP according to issue type 
    Type of Issues Contested by the EP 
   Total   Policy 
Substance  Budgetary  Fundamental 
Rights  
Institutional 
Powers  
Total proposals  973             
Total Issues  2369  1528  256  269  316 
of which EP successful (%)  1230 
(51.9) 
754 
(49.3) 
109 
(42.6) 
214 
(79.6) 
153 
(48.4) 
          
Co-decision Proposals   470             
Co-decision Issues   1567  1080  146  196  145 
of which EP successful (%)  1022 
(65.2) 
670 
(62.0) 
75 
(51.4) 
163  
(83.2) 
114 
(78.6) 
          
Consultation Proposals  503             
Consultation  Issues  802  448  110  73  171 
of which EP successful (%)  208 
(25.9) 
84 
(18.8) 
34 
(30.9) 
51 
(69.9) 
39 
(22.8) 
   30
The Relevance of the Policy Area Context for the EP’s Legislative Influence  
Several studies have suggested that the legislative influence of the European Parliament 
varies in different areas of EU policy (Judge et al, 1994; Shackleton, 2000; Burns, 2005; 
Thomson and Hosli, 2006). Judge et al (1994) argued that policy type is one of many 
important variables shaping the EP’s influence and suggested that it is in the field of 
regulatory policy that the EP has the greatest scope for exercising influence. Through case 
studies, Burns (2005: 488) also studies the EP’s influence across several EU policy areas, 
where she finds that the Parliament has more scope to comment on and to influence 
regulatory policies than distributive policies. Overall, the few empirical studies of EP 
influence largely agree that the regulatory field allows the European Parliament greater 
scope to shape policy outcomes. This is a very realistic conclusion, given that co-decision 
largely applies to the regulatory field. By studying legislative decision-making across all 
EU policy areas, this paper finds significant variation of EP influence across policies.  
 
Table 1.5 EP Legislative Influence: Policy Areas, Proposals, Issues: 1999 – 2007 
 
Policy Area (Commission DG)  Co-decision  Consultation  Total   % EP 
Success  
   Proposals Issues Proposals Issues Proposals Issues    
Agriculture & Rural Development  7  14  73  148  80  162 23.5  % 
Budget 9  28  26  43  35  71 71.8  % 
Development  9 20 4 9  13  29 55.2  % 
Economic and Financial Affairs  2  14  28  33  30  47 25.5  % 
Education and Culture  25  74  4  8  29  82 68.3  % 
Employment and Social Affairs   20  68  18  29  38  97 64.9  % 
Energy and Transport  93  350  6  12  99  362 59.4  % 
Enterprise and Industry  53  146  3  8  56  154 67.5  % 
Environment 50  205  8  11  58  216 59.3  % 
Eurostat, Statistical Office  32  48  1  2  33  50 66.0  % 
External Relations  12  28  26  38  38  66 40.9  % 
Fisheries 1  1  106  128  107  129 11.6  % 
General Secretariat  2  9  8  22  10 31  54.8  % 
Health and Consumer Protection  56  206  21  39  77 245  61.6  % 
Information Society  20  57  2  5  22 62  64.5  % 
Internal Market and Services  41  151  6  9  47 160  55.0  % 
Justice, Freedom and Security  24  94  123  198  147 292  42.5  % 
Research 7  32  19  33  26 65  53.8  % 
Taxation and Customs Union  7  22  21  27  28 49  34.7  % 
Total Proposals/Total Issues   470 1567 503 802 973 2369  51.90% 
  Own calculations.    31
Table 1.5 presents the average EP success rate in each of the 19 EU policy areas. 
The EP was least successful in the policy areas of Fisheries (11.6%), Agriculture (23.5%), 
Economic and Financial Affairs (25.5%), Taxation and Customs (34.7%), External 
Relations (40.9%) and Justice, Freedom and Security (42.5%). These results are not 
surprising given that proposals in these areas fall mainly under the consultation procedure. 
In contrast, the EP was most successful in the policy areas of Budgets (71.8%), Education 
and Culture (68.3%), Enterprise and Industry (67.5%), Employment and Social Affairs 
(64.9%), Information Society (64.5%) and Health and Consumer Protection (61.6%). 
 
Defining the Distributive Character of EU Policy Areas 
What is a distributive policy area and how to define it? Is the distributive/regulatory 
divide a binary variable? Are some policies more distributive than others? There is a clear 
distinction in the EU literature between the general characteristics of regulatory and 
distributive policies (Hix, 2005; Wallace et al, 2005). Some authors have classified EU 
policy areas according to a binary divide: regulatory and distributive (Broscheid and Coen, 
2007). However, as could be seen from Table 1.2 each EU policy area consists of both 
regulatory and distributive proposals. Moreover, EP influence is here analysed through the 
examination of proposals and the issues contested within them. Therefore, dichotomizing 
the distributive/regulatory divide in EU policy areas may lead to inaccurate results.  
To overcome this issue, the paper adopts the following methodology for defining 
the distributive character of an EU policy area. First, as indicated in Table 1.2, each EU 
policy area includes administrative, regulatory and distributive proposals. In the case of 
distributive proposals the costs are covered by either the EU budget or Member States’ 
budgets. Such proposals are highly salient for Member States and governments are 
reluctant to incorporate the EP’s demands. These proposals were grouped into one category  
= Distributive. In the case of regulatory and administrative proposals the costs are covered   32
by either private actors or there are no significant costs. Such proposals should be relatively 
less salient for Member States and governments may be more willing to incorporate the 
EP’s preferences. These proposals were grouped into the second category = Regulatory.   
Second, in each EU policy area the percentage of Distributive proposals and the 
percentage of Regulatory proposals were calculated. The continuous Distributive Policy 
Area variable was constructed to indicate the percentage of distributive proposals in a 
policy area. Therefore, EU policy areas with a relatively higher percentage of regulatory 
proposals are located on the left of the axis, whereas policy areas with a relatively higher 
percentage of distributive proposals are located to the right of the axis (see Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3 Concentration of Distributive Proposals (%) per EU Policy Area  
 
 
Note: Distributive proposals here include distributive (EU budget) and distributive (Member States’ 
budgets) proposals. Regulatory proposals include regulatory (private actors) and administrative 
(insignificant cost) proposals as defined in Table 1.2.     
 
The EU policy areas with a relatively higher percentage of distributive proposals 
were Budget (94.3%), Research (92.3%), Economic and Financial Affairs (83.3%), 
Education and Culture (75.9%), Development (76.9%), External Relations and 
Employment Affairs (60.5%). On the opposite side of the axis, the policy areas with a 
relatively lower percentage of distributive proposals were Internal Market (17%), 
Enterprise and Industry (17.9%), Health, Consumer Protection, and Environment (23.4%).   33
3.1 Statistical Analysis 
To test the main argument of the paper that package deals increase the European 
Parliament’s influence in distributive policy areas, two independent variables and their 
interaction term are of central importance for the analysis
19.  
First, the individual-level dichotomous Package Deal variable is included in the 
models. It = 1 if there is evidence in the Council’s internal documents and/or in the EP 
plenary statements and summaries that a package deal on a proposal between the Council 
and the EP has been concluded and it = 0 if otherwise. To capture the effect of the policy 
area type on EP success, the macro-level continuous Distributive Policy Area variable is 
included. It measures the difference between the percentage of distributive proposals and 
the percentage of regulatory proposals in a policy area (as described above). The analysis 
includes the cross-level interaction term Package Deal x Distributive Policy Area.  
Several control variables are also included in the model. First, the dichotomous Co-
decision variable is included to account for the effect of the legislative procedure. It = 1 for 
co-decision proposals and it = 0 for consultation proposals. Second, the categorical Issue 
Type variable captures the effect of the different issues the EP contests and their probability 
of success. It = 1 for budgetary issues, = 2 for policy substance issues, = 3 for fundamental 
rights issues, and it = 4 for institutional powers issues.  
Third, the dichotomous Council Impatience variable controls for the effect of 
institutional impatience on legislative outcomes in EU decision-making. It = 1 if the 
Council had started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before 
the EP had done so and it = 0 if the Parliament had started discussions and prepared a draft 
legislative text earlier than the Council. This variable was measured by comparing the dates 
of the first draft texts on a legislative proposal held in the EP and the Council’s document 
registers.  
                                                 
19 see the Appendices for full coding, sources and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis 
as well as for correlations between the variables.   34
In addition, two variables control for the internal cohesion of the European 
Parliament on its legislative influence. The continuous EP Cohesion variable measures EP 
cohesion at the EP drafting committee level. It measures the size of the majority in the EP 
drafting committee in favour of a report, as a percentage of those voting. In addition, the 
dichotomous EP Plenary Support variable measures EP cohesion at the EP Plenary level. It 
= 1 if the EP plenary supports the committee report in its entirety and MEPs do not submit 
replacement amendments and it = 0 if the plenary amends/rejects the committee proposal.  
Furthermore, to account for the impact of the relative intensities of preferences of 
the Council and the Parliament on EP success, two variables are included in the analysis. 
The dichotomous Council – EP Salience Tie variable controls for the distance between the 
EP’ and the Council’s preference intensities. It = 1 if the relative salience size was different 
from zero (regardless of the direction). The distance Relative EP Salience variable 
measures the relative difference between the EP’s and the Council’s importance attached to 
a proposal. It captures the size and the direction of the relative preference intensities. 
Finally, Commission Support controls for the impact of the Commission on the EP’s 
legislative influence. It = 1 if the Commission expresses its support for an EP demand in 
front of the EP plenary, after informal meetings with MEPs or in its opinion on the EP 
position; and it = 0 if the Commission does not support the EP on a given issue. 
Several empty multi-level models are estimated to explore the hierarchical nature of 
the data and to determine whether to include an analytical level in the statistical analysis. 
The 2639 issues are nested in 973 legislative proposals, which are nested in 19 policy areas, 
which are nested in 8 years. It seems that the year does not have an effect on the probability 
of European Parliament success in EU legislative outcomes. In contrast, the policy area 
level seems to have an important contextual effect on EP success. In addition, the proposal 
level seems to have an effect on EP success. Therefore, the statistical tests of EP success 
(in Table 1.6) will include these two contextual levels (separately and combined).   35
Table 1.6 Variation of EP Success across Proposals, Policy Areas, and Time  
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
Empty Models   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
  Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E.  Coef/S.E.  Coef/S.E. 
Fixed Effects           
Intercept  .077 *  .045  -.006  .005  -.006  .015  < .001 
  (.044) (.176) (.056) (.009) (.056)  (.193)  (.101) 
Random Effects            
Proposal Level (std.dev.)  -  -  .816 *  -  .816 *  .583 ***  .206 
     (.109)    (.109) (.116) (.269) 
Policy Area Level (std.dev.)  -  .727 *  -  .928 *  -  .794 *  .933 * 
   (.132)  (.103)    (.147) (.105) 
Year Level  (std.dev.)  .041  -  -  < .001  < .001  -  < .001 
  (.096)    (.107)  (.104)    (.108) 
-2 x Log Likelihood  3280.580  3091.223  3251.164  3109.822  3251.164  3081.3104  3109.656 
N  Years  8 8 8 8 8  8  8 
N Policy Areas  19  19  19  19  19  19  19 
N  Proposals  973 973 973 973 973  973  973 
N  Issues  2369 2369 2369 2369 2369  2369  2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01    
Results from the Binary Logistic Regressions 
Models 1-3 are estimated with the individual level Package Deal and the macro-level 
Distributive Policy  Area variables. Models 4-6 include their cross-level interaction 
Package Deal x Distributive Policy Area, while accounting for the proposal and policy area 
contexts. Models 7 - 11 add the control variables outlined earlier. The results support the 
argument that package deals lead to more EP legislative influence in distributive policy 
areas. The results confirm the general understanding in the EU policy-making research that 
the EP enjoys stronger legislative influence in regulatory policy areas. Although the EP is 
relatively weaker in distributive policy areas, the results support the argument that through 
package deals the EP manages to influence important and costly legislative proposals.  
The Package Deal x Distributive Policy Area interaction term is significant and 
positively correlated with EP success. Even when the control variables are added to the 
model (Models 7 - 11), the coefficient of the cross-level interaction remains significant. 
Therefore, contrary to the traditional view of the European Parliament as a relatively weak 
legislative institution in distributive policies, through logrolling, the EP manages to 
influence legislation that is expensive for the Member States.    36
Table 1.7 Conditions for EP Success in EU Decision-Making: 1999 – 2007 
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Fixed Effects  Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Individual Level Variables        
Package Deal  .968 ***  .662 ***  .719 ***  .357 .029 .061 
 (.119)  (.095)  (.119)  (.240) (.206) (.228) 
Co-decision  - - - - - - 
        
Council Impatience  - - - - - - 
        
Urgent  - - - - - - 
        
Urgent for the Commission  -  -  -  -  -  - 
        
European  Parliament  Cohesion  - - - - - - 
        
EP  Plenary  Support  - - - - - - 
        
Relative  EP  Salience    - - - - - - 
        
Parliament  -  Council  Salience  Tie  - - - - - - 
        
Commission  Support  - - - - - - 
        
Issues  Type  (base  budgetary)        
Policy  Substance  Issues  - - - - - - 
        
Fundamental  Rights  Issues  - - - - - - 
        
Institutional  Powers  Issues  - - - - - - 
        
Package  Deal  x  Policy  Substance  - - - - - - 
        
Package  Deal  x  Fundamental  Rights  - - - - - - 
        
Package  Deal  x  Institutional  Issues  - - - - - - 
        
Macro - Level Variable             
Distributive Policy Area  -.473 *  -.203  -.238  -1.108 ***  -.973  -.995 
  (.251) (.681) (.730) (.338) (.728) (.768) 
Cross-Level  Interaction          
Package Deal x Distributive Policy  -  -  -  1.433 ***  1.642 ***  1.657 *** 
      (.507)  (.478)  (.520) 
Intercept  -.119  -.077 .097 .152 .235 .219 
  (.124) (.384) (.384) (.154) (.300) (.422) 
Random Effects         
Proposal Level (std.dev.)  .731 **  -  .494 ***  .705 **  -  .446 *** 
  (.109)  (.383)  (.110)  (.136) 
Policy Area Level (std.dev.)  -  .681 **  .726 *  -  .691 *  .725 * 
   (.126)  (.136)  (.127)  (.136) 
Year Level  (std.dev.)  -  -  -  -  -  - 
-2 x Log Likelihood  3171.894  3041.960  3036.533  3163.894  3029.841  3026.275 
N  Years  8 8 8 8 8 8 
N  Policy  Areas  19 19 19 19 19 19 
N  Proposals  973 973 973 973 973 973 
N  Issues  2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   37
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11 
Fixed Effects  Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables        
Package Deal  .568 ***  .375 ***  -.163 -.459 -.459  .632 
 (.104)  (.107)  (.220) (.398) (.398)   
Codecision  -  1.563 ***  1.571 ***  1.592 ***  1.592 ***  4.193 
   (.139)  (.140)  (.138)  (.138)  
Council Impatience  .397 ***  .299 ***  .298 ***  .305 ***  .305 ***  1.356 
  (.100) (.102) (.102) (.103) (.103)   
Urgent  .066 .026 .028 .023 .023 1.023 
  (.113) (.115) (.115) (.116) (.116)   
Urgent for the Commission  .440 ***  .346 **  .308 **  .298 **  .298 **  1.347 
  (.146) (.150) (.150) (.151) (.151)   
European Parliament Cohesion  .008 **  .007 **  .008 **  .008 **  .008 **  1.008 
  (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)   
EP Committee Plenary Supported  .142   .345 ***  .336 ***  .341 ***  .341 ***  1.407 
  (.117) (.120) (.120) (.120) (.120)   
Relative EP Salience   -.071 ***  -.058 **  -.059 **  -.056 **  -.056 **  .945 
  (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026)   
Parliament - Council Salience Tie  -.417 ***  -.317 ***  -.293 ***  -.292 ***  -.292 ***  .746 
  (.106) (.106) (.106) (.106) (.106)   
Commission Support  .805 ***  .756 ***  .753 ***  .750 ***  .750 ***  2.117 
  (.099) (.099) (.099) (.099) (.099)   
Issues  Type  (base  budgetary)        
Policy Substance Issues  .117  .142  .149  -.005  -.005  .995 
  (.160) (.164) (.165) (.209) (.209)   
Fundamental Rights Issues  1.544 ***  1.590 ***  1.615 ***  1.813 ***  1.813 ***  6.128 
  (.226) (.233) (.233) (.294) (.294)   
Institutional Powers Issues  .573 ***  .698 ***  .692 ***  .329  .329  1.389 
  (.195) (.200) (.201) (.355) (.355)   
Package Deal x Policy Substance  -  -  -  .343 .343 1.409 
       (.327) (.327)   
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights  -  -  -  -.644 -.644  .520 
       (.449) (.449)   
Package Deal x Institutional Issues  -  -  -  1.026 **  1.026 **  2.791 
       (.424) (.424)   
Macro - Level Variable             
Distributive  Policy  Area  -.383 .345 -.289 -.333 -.333  .717 
  (.635) (.404) (.453) (.435) (.435)   
Cross-Level  Interaction        
Package Deal x Distributive Policy  -  -  1.371 ***  1.371 ***  1.371 ***  3.940 
     (.490)  (.511)  (.511)   
Intercept  -1.673 ***  -3.021 ***  -2.757 ***  -2.656 ***  -2.656 ***  - 
  (.507) (.448) (.448) (.456) (.456)   
Random Effects         
Proposal Level (std.dev.)  -  -  <.001  -  -  - 
     (.186)     
Policy Area Level (std.dev.)  .613 **  .310 ***  .289 ***  .248 ***  .248 ***  - 
  (.117) (.090) (.090) (.088) (.088)   
Year Level  (std.dev.)  -  -  -  -  -  - 
        
-2 x Log Likelihood  2815.010  2693.189  2685.311  2670.399  2670.399    
N  Years  8 8 8 8 8   
N  Policy  Areas  19 19 19 19 19   
N  Proposals  973 973 973 973 973   
N  Issues  2369 2369 2369 2369 2369   
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   38
Figure 1.4 plots the predicted probability of EP success on EU legislative outcomes 
according to the use of package deals and the concentration of distributive proposals in 
policy areas. The plot confirms that the legislative influence of the EP is much greater in 
regulatory policy areas. The probability of EP success significantly decreases with the 
increase in distributive proposals per policy area. EP success in the absence of a package 
deal is most likely in the policy areas of Internal Market and Services, Enterprise and 
Industry, Health and Consumer Protection, and Environment. In the absence of a package 
deal, the EP is least likely to succeed in the areas of Budget, Research, Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Development and Education and Culture. 
 
Figure 1.4 Effect of Package Deals and Distributive Policies on EP Legislative Influence  
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  Note: Probabilities predicted based on Model 11 in Table 1.6.   
 
However, although the EP enjoys very little legislative influence in distributive 
policy areas, when package deals are negotiated this is not the case. Package deals ensure a 
greater than 60% probability of EP success in all EU policy areas. Hence, although package 
deals are usually fast - tracked and deprive some MEPs of full participation in the decision-
making process, the European Parliament benefits as an institution from legislative 
exchange with the Council.    39
Not surprisingly, the legislative procedure is a defining factor in the probability of 
EP influence on legislative outcomes. Co-decision allows the European Parliament an 
equal legislative status with the Council and this translates in the EP significantly 
influencing co-decision proposals. Nevertheless, as Figure 8.2 illustrates, package deals 
increase the likelihood of EP success in both the co-decision and consultation procedure. 
Informal logrolls allow the EP to negotiate consultation proposals on ‘co-decision like’ 
terms with the Council.  
 
Figure 1.5 Effect of Package Deals and Legislative Procedures on EP Legislative Influence  
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Assuming the other variables are at their mean, in the co-decision procedure, the 
probability of EP success through a package deal increases from 60% to 82 % as the 
concentration of distributive proposals per policy area increases. In the consultation 
procedure, package deals increase the likelihood of EP success from 25% to 55 % as the 
concentration of distributive proposals increases. These findings confirm that the use of 
package deals in the EU legislative process increases the likelihood of the EP’s legislative 
influence on policy outcomes in both the consultation and co-decision procedures.    40
The results support the argument that package deals increase the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament in distributive policy areas. Package deals are 
concluded regularly in EU decision-making as they allow the EP and the Council to 
exchange favours and negotiate enforceable agreements. Logrolls are usually fast-tracked 
and deprive some MEPs from their full involvement in the legislative process. 
Nevertheless, through package deals the European Parliament gains the ability to influence 
some of the EU’s most expensive policies. Thus, the European Parliament manages to 
translate its budgetary powers into legislative influence.  
 
What Exactly Does the European Parliament Gain in Package Legislation  
Table 1.8 below presents the distribution of EP success according to issue type in 
package and non-package legislation. First, package deal proposals contain more issues 
than non-package legislation. This is in line with the theoretical argument that package 
deals take place when multiple issues are negotiated at the same time. A package deal 
proposal contains on average 3.56 issues (868 issues in 244 package proposals) whereas a 
non-package deal proposal contains on average 2.06 issues (1501 issues in 729 proposals).  
 
Table 1.8 Success Rate of Issues according to Issue Type: Package Deals  
    Type of Issues Contested by the EP 
   Total   Policy 
Substance  Budgetary  Fundamental 
Rights  
Institutional 
Powers  
Total proposals  973             
Total Issues  2369  1528  256  269  316 
of which EP successful (%)  1230 
(51.9) 
754 
(49.3) 
109 
(42.6) 
214 
(79.6) 
153 
(48.4) 
          
Package Deal Proposals   244             
Package Deal Issues   868  560  100  106  102 
of which EP successful (%)  557 
(64.2)  
343 
(61.3) 
51 
 (51.0)  
84 
(79.2) 
79 
(77.5) 
          
No Package Deal Proposals  729             
No Package Deal  Issues  1501  968  156  163  214 
of which EP successful (%)  673 
(44.8) 
411 
(42.5) 
58 
(37.2) 
130 
(79.8) 
74 
(34.6) 
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Overall, the total EP success row shows that the EP was most successful when it 
contested fundamental rights issues (79.6%), followed by policy substance issues (49.3%), 
institutional powers issues (48.4%) and budgetary issues (42.6%). This result is intuitive. 
The Parliament as the ‘voice of the people’ is likely to succeed in its demands for human 
rights, transparency, privacy, data protection, and children’s rights. On the other hand, 
when it comes to funding and budgetary matters, Member States are less open to 
negotiations. That explains the EP’s low success rate in budgetary issues.  
When the types of issues are considered it becomes clearer what in practice the 
European Parliament gains in package deals as compared to non-logrolled legislation. 
In package legislation the EP was most successful in fundamental rights issues (79.2%), 
followed by institutional powers issues (77.5%), policy substance issues (61.3%) and 
budgetary issues (51.0%). In non-package legislation, the EP was most successful in 
fundamental rights issues (79.8%), followed by policy substance issues (42.5%), budgetary 
issues (37.2%) and institutional powers issues (34.6%). The biggest increase in EP success 
between package and non-package legislation is in institutional powers issues. EP success 
increases with 42.9 per cent. This is followed by an increase of 18.8 per cent in EP success 
in policy substantial issues and of 13.8 per cent in budgetary issues. Fundamental rights 
issues do not seem to be affected by package legislation, there is less than 1% difference 
between the two categories.  
This is confirmed by the statistical results (Table 1.7). The full binary logit models 
of EP success across all policy areas (Models 10 - 11) include interaction terms for 
Package Deals and Issue Types. The Package Deal x Institutional Powers Issue interaction 
is statistically significant and positively correlated with EP success, whereas the 
Institutional Powers Issue coefficient is non-significant. Therefore, the European 
Parliament is more likely to gain institutional powers issues when package deals are 
negotiated.    42
Budgetary issues are much more salient to Member States than the institutional 
powers they are giving in exchange to the European Parliament. Member States’ 
preferences are much more intense about issues such as spending, co-financing, funding for 
programs and Community actions than they are about institutional issues such as the EP’s 
ability to monitor and control the establishment of new bodies, parliamentary scrutiny, the 
writing of reports to the EP periodically. On the other hand, MEPs value highly an increase 
in the institutional and legislative powers of their chamber. When the two chambers attach 
different preference intensities to issues, trade is possible and logrolls are profitable for 
both the Council and the European Parliament.   
In addition to the significant effect of package deals on EP legislative influence, 
several significant results were identified in this paper. First, the impatience of the Council 
matters across EU policy areas. The Council Impatience variable is positively correlated 
with EP success. An impatient Council is more likely to cooperate with the EP and 
therefore more likely to grant concessions to the Parliament in return for a fast-track 
decision. In contrast, when the EP is relatively more impatient about the conclusion of a 
legislative deal, it is in a weaker bargaining position.  
Second, EP Cohesion is a significant predictor of EP success across all EU policy 
areas. EP cohesion at the committee level seems to be slightly less important than EP 
cohesion at the plenary level. Nevertheless, both the EP Cohesion and EP Plenary Support 
variables are significant and positively correlated with EP success. Regardless of the policy 
area, the legislative influence of the EP depends on its ability to secure a cohesive 
institutional position on legislative proposals.  
Third, support from the European Commission significantly increases the chances 
of EP success. The Commission’s position on EU legislation is important and the European 
Parliament benefits from the Commission’s endorsement of EP proposals. The 
Commission’s agenda-setting and implementation powers give it a strong voice in   43
legislative decision-making and the EP benefits from having the Commission on its side. 
Member States are more likely to reconsider their positions when both the European 
Parliament and the Commission oppose them.  
Moreover, the Council - EP Salience Tie variable is significant and negatively 
correlated with EP success. The EP is more likely to fail to affect legislative outcomes 
when both institutions share similar intensities of preferences over proposals. Therefore, 
the European Parliament will be more successful if it can trade its support for a Council 
proposal in exchange for the Council’s support on a salient EP proposal.  
Up to now the variable EP Success was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 = 
success and 0 = failure. Now EP success is analysed as an ordinal variable with 4categories 
where 0 = failure, 1 = low success, 2 = medium success, and 3 = high success. By including 
the degree of EP success in the analysis, the results of the statistical tests will provide a 
clearer picture of the extent to which the EP influences legislative outcomes across policy 
areas in the EU. To test the effect of the independent variables from the logit models above, 
the following section will use an ordinal logit regression. Here EP success is the dependent 
variable with four ordinal outcomes. To account for the conditional effect of the policy area 
level, the standard errors will be clustered around the 19 policy areas
20.  
Table 1.8 Ordinal Distribution of European Parliament Success  
  Issues Contested by the EP 
EP Success Ordinal   Consultation  Codecision  Total  
Category 3 = High Success  128  862  990 
 (%)  (15.9)  (55.0)  (41.8) 
Category 2 = Medium Success  49  117  166 
 (%)  (6.1)  (7.5)  (7.0) 
Category 1 = Low Success  30  41  71 
 (%)  (3.7)  (2.6)  (3.0) 
Category 0 = Failure   595  547  1142 
 (%)  (74.2)  34.9  (48.2) 
      
Total 802  1567  2369 
                                                 
20 One of the assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the relationship between each pair 
of outcome groups is the same. Ordinal logistic regression assumes that the coefficients that describe the 
relationship between the lowest versus all higher categories of the dependent variable are the same as 
those that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories. This is 
called the proportional odds assumption. (Agresti, 2007)   44
It is important to explore the variation of EP success within policy areas and 
procedures
21 (see Table 1.9). The consideration of the different degrees of EP success will 
provide a more detailed account of the legislative influence of the European Parliament in 
EU policy areas. In some policy areas, the legislative influence of the EP fell 
predominantly in the two extreme categories (0 = failure or 3 = high success). For example, 
in the policy areas of Development, Information Society and External Relations, the EP 
either fully achieved its legislative demands or it failed to influence the legislative text (less 
than 5% of EP success falls in categories 1 and 2). On the other hand, in the policy areas of 
Budget, Internal Market and Services, and Research EP success varies considerably across 
categories 1, 2, and 3 (more than 18% of EP success falls in categories 1 and 2). 
Table 1.9 Degrees of EP Legislative Influence: Variation across Policy Areas 
  EP Legislative Influence: Degrees 
Policy Area (Commission DG)  Failure =0  Success =1  Success =2  Success = 3 
   N  % N % N % N % 
Agriculture & Rural Development  124  (76.5%)  4  (2.5%)  11  (6.8%)  23  (14.2%) 
Budget  20  (28.2%) 12 (16.9%)  2  (2.8%)  37 (52.1%) 
Development 13  (44.8%)  0  -  1  (3.4%)  15  (51.7%) 
Economic and Financial Affairs  35  (74.5%)  2  (4.3%)  1  (2.1%)  9  (19.1%) 
Education  and  Culture  25  (30.5%)  3 (3.7%) 7 (8.5%)  47  (57.3%) 
Employment and Social Affairs   34  (35.1%)  1  (1.0%)  5  (5.2%)  57  (58.8%) 
Energy and Transport  150  (41.4%)  17  (4.7%)  34  (9.4%)  161  (44.5%) 
Enterprise and Industry  50  (32.5%)  0  -  15  (9.7%)  89  (57.8%) 
Environment  88  (40.7%)  4 (1.9%) 8 (3.7%)  116  (53.7%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office  18  (36.0%)  0  -  3  (6.0%)  29  (58.0%) 
External  Relations  39  (59.1%)  2 (3.0%) 1 (1.5%)  24  (36.4%) 
Fisheries  114  (88.4%)  1 (0.8%) 7 (5.4%) 7 (5.4%) 
General  Secretariat  14  (45.2%)  1 (3.2%) 2 (6.5%)  14  (45.2%) 
Health and Consumer Protection  94  (38.4%)  6  (2.4%)  19  (7.8%)  126  (51.4%) 
Information Society  22  (35.5%)  0  -  0  -  40  (64.5%) 
Internal Market and Services  72  (45.0%)  7  (4.4%)  23  (14.4%)  58  (36.3%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security  168  (57.5%)  8  (2.7%)  18  (6.2%)  98  (33.6%) 
Research  30  (46.2%) 2  (3.1%)  7  (10.8%) 26 (40.0%) 
Taxation and Customs Union  32  (65.3%)  1  (2.0%)  2.  (4.1%)  14  (28.6%) 
                 
Total Issues   1142 (48.2%) 71  (3.0%)  166  (7.0%)  990 (41.8%) 
                                                 
21 In the consultation procedure, the distribution of EP success was as follows. 74.2% (595 issues) fell in 
category 0 = failure. Only 3.7 % (30 issues) of the observations fell in category 1 (low success) and 6.1 % (49 
issues) fell in category 2 (medium success). 16 % (128 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 (high 
success). In the co-decision procedure, the distribution of EP success was as follows. 34.9% (547 issues) fell 
in category 0 = failure. Only 2.6% (41 issues) of the observations fell in category 1 (low success) and 7.5% 
(117 issues) fell in category 2 (medium success). 55 % (862 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 
(high). In total, 48.2% (1142 issues) fell in category  0 = failure. 3.0% (71 issues) fell in category 1, 7.0% 
(990 issues) fell in category 2, and 41.8% (990 issues) of the observations fell in category 3.     45
Ordinal and Multinomial Logistic Models 
  In order to explore the variation of the degrees of EP legislative influence, the 
following models as estimated using ordinal and multinomial logistic regression. The 
standard errors are clustered around policy areas, in order to take account of the 
conditioning effect of the policy area on the probability of EP success in legislative 
outcomes. Exactly the same independent variables and interaction terms were used in the 
binary logit, the ordinal logit and the multinomial logit. The estimation of regressions for 
EP success with identical independent factors allows for an easy comparison of the effects 
of the independent variables and interaction terms when EP success is treated as a 
dichotomous, ordinal and categorical outcome. The ordinal logits in Table 1.10 (Models 1 
to 5) were estimated with EP success as an ordinal variable where 0 = failure, 1 = low 
success, 2 = medium success and 3 = high success. The multinomial logits in Table 1.11 
(Models 1 to 5) were estimated with EP success as a categorical variable where 0 = failure, 
1 = low success, 2 = medium success and 3 = high success. 
The results of the ordered logit regressions (Table 1.10) confirm the findings of the 
previous section. Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success. The results confirm 
that the presence of package deals increases the probability of EP success in distributive 
policy areas. However, when the degree of EP success is taken into account the cross-level 
interaction term Package Deal x Distributive Policy has a weaker effect
22. This result 
suggests two things. First, even when the degree of EP influence is taken into account, 
package deals increase the probability of EP success and furthermore, they increase the 
probability of EP success in distributive policy outcomes. Second, when the degree of EP 
influence is taken into account, package deals are not such a strong predictor of EP success 
and the Package Deal x Distributive Policy interaction effect is much weaker.  
                                                 
22 The coefficient of the interaction term and its significance are reduced when the degree of EP success is 
considered. If the full binary and ordered logit models are compared, the power of the cross-level interaction 
decreases from a predictor with a coefficient of 1.317 (se .511), significant at the 1% level with a 
corresponding odds ratio of 3.940 (in the binary model) to a coefficient of .988 (se .587), significant at the 
10% level and a corresponding odds ratio of 2.660 (in the ordered model).   46
Table 1.10 Ordinal Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success 
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
  Ordered Logit (Clustered S.E) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Fixed Effects  Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables         
Package Deal  .731 ***  .649 ***  .375 ***  -.046 -.243  .632 
 (.216)  (.174)  (.144)  (.217) (.513)   
Codecision  -  -  1.771 ***  1.782 ***  1.781 ***  5.935 
     (.129)  (.133)  (.133)   
Council Impatience  -  .331 **  .250 **  .251**  .263 **  1.301 
   (.136)  (.126)  (.120)  (.121)   
Urgent -  -  .140  .074  -.069  -.069  .937 
   (.136)  (.112)  (.119)  (.120)   
Urgent for the Commission  -  .619 ***  .396 **  .355 *  .346 *  1.413 
   (.226)  (.197)  (.098)  (.249)   
European Parliament Cohesion  -  .011 **  .011 ***  .011 ***  .011 ***  1.012 
   (.005)  (.004)  (.003)  (.003)   
EP Committee Plenary Supported  -  .002  .328 ***  .321 ***  .326 ***  1.386 
   (.116)  (.104)  (.106)  (.107)   
Relative EP Salience   -  -.045   -.026   -.026   -.026   .974 
   (.036)  (.027)  (.037)  (.037)   
Parliament - Council Salience Tie  -  -.432 ***  -.251 ***  -.233 ***  -.232 ***  .973 
   (.079)  (.082)  (.082)  (.084)   
Commission Support  -  .818 ***  .686 ***  .685 ***  .677 ***  1.967 
   (.136)  (.128)  (.128)  (.124)   
Issues Type (base budgetary)             
Policy Substance Issues  -  .140  .122  .117  -.001  .999 
   (.104)  (.219)  (.217)  (.236)   
Fundamental Rights Issues  -  1.440 ***  1.527***  1.539 ***  1.809 ***  6.104 
   (.139)  (.286)  (.283)  (.369)   
Institutional Powers Issues  -  .513 *  .785 **  .774 **  .440  1.553 
   (.289)  (.348)  (.339)  (.373)   
Package Deal x Policy Substance  -  -  -  -  .226  1.305 
         (.512)   
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights  -  -  -  -  -.760  .467 
         (.635)   
Package Deal x Institutional Issues  -  -  -  -  .909   2.483 
         (.809)   
Macro - Level Variable             
Distributive Policy Area  -.434 -.689  .374 -.113 -.156  .856 
  (.502) (.556) (.509) (.229) (.522)   
Cross-Level Interaction             
Package Deal x Distributive Policy  -  -  -  1.037 *  .978 *  2.660 
       (.625)  (.587)   
Cut 1   .157 1.644  3.384  3.192  3.100   
Cut 2   .140 1.783  3.538  3.346  3.256   
Cut 3   .431 2.109  3.903  3.711  3.624   
         
Log Pseudolikelihood  -2345.973 -2202.982 -2065.833 -2062.794 -2053.491    
N Policy Areas  19  19  19  19  19  19 
N Issues  2369  2369  2369  2369  2369  2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
   47
Table 1.11 Multinomial Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success 
 
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
          
  Multinomial Logit (Clustered S.E) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Baseline (Failure = 0) 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Fixed Effects  Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Individual Level Variables          
Package Deal  1.078 ***  .428 **  .811 ***  .958 **  .371 *  .717 *** 
  (.396) (.220) (.236) (.429) (.211) (.189) 
Codecision  - - - - - - 
          
Council Impatience  - - -  -.060 .232  .367 ** 
      (.330) (.180) (.153) 
Urgent -  -  -  .389  -.110  -.158 
      (.293)  (.321)  (.150) 
Urgent for the Commission  - - -  .396 .513  .725 *** 
      (.428) (.359) (.252) 
European Parliament Cohesion  - - -  -.011 -.007  .014 ** 
      (.011) (.005) (.007) 
EP Committee Plenary Supported  - - -  .202  .258 **  -.006 
      (.302)  (.124)  (.134) 
Relative EP Salience   -  -  -  -.166 ***  -.118 *  -.056 
      (.055) (.067) (.043) 
Parliament - Council Salience Tie  - - -  -.604  ***  -.174  -.499 *** 
      (.237)  (.134)  (.099) 
Commission Support  - - -  .238  .998 ***  .885 *** 
      (.255)  (.217) (.145) 
Issues  Type  (base  budgetary)          
Policy  Substance  Issues  -  -  -  .276 .196 .162 
      (.636)  (.357)  (.118) 
Fundamental Rights Issues  - - -  .292  .939 ***  1.646 *** 
      (.695)  (.280) (.152) 
Institutional Powers Issues  - - -  -.360 -.001  .609 ** 
      (.547) (.660) (.278) 
Package  Deal  x  Policy  Substance  - - - - - - 
          
Package  Deal  x  Fundamental  Rights - - - - - - 
          
Package  Deal  x  Institutional  Issues  - - - - - - 
          
Macro - Level Variable              
Distributive Policy Area  1.164  -1.200 *  -.424  1.460 -.769 -.788 
 (1.014)  (.720)  (.571)  (.904) (.744) (.629) 
Cross-Level  Interaction          
Package  Deal  x  Distributive  Policy  - - - - - - 
          
Intercept   -3.735 ***  -1.588 ***  -.263  -3.321 ***  -2.134 ***  -2.165*** 
  (.607)  (.345)  (.303) (1.142) (.783)  (.695) 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -2334.940 -2169.648 
N  Policy  Areas  19 19 19 19 19 19 
N  Issues  2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   48
Multinomial Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success (continued)  
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
          
  Multinomial Logit (Clustered S.E) 
  Model 3  Model 4 
Baseline (Failure = 0) 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Fixed Effects  Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Individual Level Variables          
Package Deal  .902 *  .218  .388 ***  -.834 -.454 -.022 
 (.479)  (.215)  (.149)  (1.770) (.410)  (.246) 
Codecision .100  .702 ***  2.065 ***  .166  .714 ***  2.070 *** 
 (.495)  (.237) (.167) (.661) (.236) (.172) 
Council Impatience  -.087  .191  .265 **  -.100 .184  .265 ** 
  (.308) (.193) (.137)  (.284) (.186) (.131) 
Urgent  .407 -.088 -.090 .443 -.082 -.085 
  (.286) (.312) (.124) (.301) (.312) (.129) 
Urgent for the Commission  .308  .366  .444 **  .088 .297  .400 * 
 (.450)  (.342)  (.212)  (.423) (.324) (.217) 
European Parliament Cohesion  -.011  -.006  .014 ***  -.011 -.006  .014 *** 
 (.012)  (.005)  (.004)  (.011) (.005) (.004) 
EP Committee Plenary Supported  .211  .419 ***  .343 ***  .173  .402 ***  .333 *** 
 (.282)  (.126) (.112) (.282)  (.137) (.113) 
Relative EP Salience   -.154 ***  -.099 -.031  -.157 ***  -.100   -.030 
  (.057)  (.067) (.042) (.058)  (.064) (.042) 
Parliament - Council Salience Tie  -.611 **  -.087  -.307 ***  -.520 **  -.056  -.289*** 
  (.256)  (.163)  (.091) (.250) (.167)  (.091) 
Commission Support  .220  .929 ***  .777 ***  .213  .924 ***  .773 *** 
 (.230)  (.221) (.146) (.235)  (.221) (.144) 
Issues  Type  (base  budgetary)          
Policy  Substance  Issues  .233 .177 .117 .216 .182 .119 
  (.577) (.388) (.243) (.560) (.381) (.241) 
Fundamental Rights Issues  .272  .964 ***  1.769 ***  .308  .988 ***  1.781 *** 
 (.570)  (.338) (.332) (.559)  (.338) (.327) 
Institutional Powers Issues  -.656  .102  .932 ***  -.715 -.091  .920 *** 
 (.559)  (.609)  (.367)  (.622) (.612) (.357) 
Package  Deal  x  Policy  Substance  - - - - - - 
          
Package  Deal  x  Fundamental  Rights - - - - - - 
          
Package  Deal  x  Institutional  Issues  - - - - - - 
          
Macro - Level Variable              
Distributive Policy Area  1.551 **  -.296  -.311  -.759 -1.008 -.109 
 (.686)  (.700)  (.546) (1.362) (.945)  (.581) 
Cross-Level  Interaction          
Package Deal x Distributive Policy  -  -  -  3.850 **  1.708 *  1.002 
      (1.770)  (1.106)  (.692) 
Intercept   -3.293 ***  -2.808 ***  - 4.177 ***  -2.349 **  -2.526 ***  -3.997 *** 
  (.861)  (.886)  (.534) (1.065) (.960)  (.525) 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -2028.344 -2021.225 
N  Policy  Areas  19 19 19 19 19 19 
N  Issues  2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   49
Multinomial Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success (continued)  
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
          
  Multinomial Logit (Clustered S.E) 
  Model 5 
Baseline (Failure = 0)  Success 1  Success 2  Success 3 
Fixed Effects  Coef/S.E.  Risk  Ratio Coef/S.E. Risk  Ratio Coef/S.E. Risk  Ratio 
Individual Level Variables                
Package Deal  -1.487 .226  -1.154 *  .315  -.143 .867 
  (1.196)    (.637)     (.637)   
Codecision .137  1.147  .713 ***  2.039  2.088 ***  8.070 
 (.416)     (.235)     (.179)   
Council Impatience  -.094  .910  .199  1.220  .280 **  1.323 
  (.284)     (.185)     (.132)  
Urgent .472  1.605  -.199  .921  -.084  .920 
  (.314)     (.083)     (.132)   
Urgent for the Commission  -.008  1.008  .260  1.297  .389 *  1.475 
  (.391)     (.365)     (.209)  
European Parliament Cohesion  -.011  .988  -.007  .994  .014 ***  1.014 
  (.012)     (.005)     (.005)  
EP Committee Plenary Supported  .211  1.235  .425  *** 1.530 .339  *** 1.403 
 (.283)     (.142)     (.112)  
Relative EP Salience   -.149 ***  .862  -.096 .908 -.029    .971 
  (.057)     (.063)     (.042)   
Parliament - Council Salience Tie  -.521** .594 -.053 .948  -.291 ***  .748 
  (.246)     (.168)     (.095)   
Commission Support  .182  1.200  .913*** 2.492 .766  ** 2.150 
 (.245)     (.218)     (.140)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)                
Policy Substance Issues  -.105  .900  - .079  .924  .034  1.034 
  (.322)     (.432)     (.260)   
Fundamental Rights Issues  -.651  .522  .917 **  2.502  2.144 ***  8.530 
 (1.143)     (.441)     (.414)  
Institutional Powers Issues  -21.174 ***     -.483  .617  .653 *  1.921 
  (.822)     (.663)     (.348)  
Package  Deal  x  Policy  Substance  .584  1.793 .718 2.051 .196 1.216 
  (1.060)     (.500)     (.586)   
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights  1.292  3.641  .108  1.114  -1.013  .363 
  (1.071)     (.578)     (.712)   
Package Deal x Institutional Issues  21.756 ***     1.766 **  5.849  .891 2.437 
       (.923)     (.920)   
Macro - Level Variable                
Distributive Policy Area  -.774    .461 -.1.030 .357  -.150  .860 
  (1.338)     (.942)     (.582)   
Cross-Level Interaction                
Package Deal x Distributive Policy  3.739 ***  42.052  1.660 5.259  .940  2.560 
 (1.893)      (1.095)     (.670)   
Intercept   -1.836      - 2.266 **     -3.970 ***   
  (1.174)     (.950)     (.444)   
Log Pseudolikelihood  -2007.037 
N  Policy  Areas  19  19 19 19 19 19 
N  Issues  2369  2369 2369 2369 2369 2369   50
This finding implies that package deals allow the EP to influence legislation much 
more than it would in the absence of a logroll. However, while package deals allow the 
European Parliament to insert its preferred policy outcomes in EU legislation, they do not 
guarantee that these preferences will be accommodated in full (i.e. 3 = high success). 
Therefore, informal logrolls are important as they allow the EP to increase its legislative 
influence and impact legislative texts (to achieve outcomes different from 0 = failure). 
However, informal logrolls do not guarantee that the EP will realize its legislative demands 
to the fullest (to achieve outcomes in category 3 = high success). While Member States are 
interested to engage in trade with the European Parliament in distributive policy areas, the 
extent of the legislative influence gained from such trade for the EP is limited.  
The results of the multinomial logit regressions (in Table 1.11) confirm the 
findings of the previous section. Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success. The 
results confirm that the presence of package deals increases the probability of EP success in 
distributive policy areas. However, the effect of package deals differs between the success 
categories. As is evident in Model 4, the effect of the cross-level interaction term Package 
Deal x Distributive Policy is strongest in the Success 1 category, followed by the Success 2 
category and the Success 3 category
23.  
This result confirms the findings from the previous tests. Package deals allow the 
EP to gain legislative influence on some issues, but the extent of these gains is limited. The 
EP is most likely to gain institutional issues in logrolls in distributive policy areas and these 
gains are most likely to be within the success 1 category = low success. Hence, the EP is 
allowed a greater institutional and legislative role through package deals, but it does not 
realize its full preferences on issues. 
 
                                                 
23 In Model 4 the coefficient of the interaction term is 3.850 (se 1.770), significant at the 5% level for the 
category Success 1 and it is decreases to 1.708 (se 1/106), significant at the 10% level for the category 
Success 2. It is non-significant in category Success 3. When the full Model 5 is estimated, the interaction 
term remains statistically significant only in category Success 1.    51
CONCLUSION 
The main objective of the paper was to explore why EU legislators increasingly engage in 
informal inter-chamber package deals and what the effects of these practices are for EU 
policy outcomes. This paper studied all completed legislation passed under the co-decision 
and consultation procedures between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. This paper found that 
package deals in the EU are likely to occur when proposals are distributive and urgent. The 
paper argued that through the package deal the EP gains legislative influence in the EU’s 
distributive policy areas. The results of the empirical analysis of more than 2350 issues 
discussed between the EP and the Council supported this argument. Package deals are used 
regularly as they allow EU legislators to achieve their most preferred policy outcomes.  
The paper demonstrated that the legislative influence of the European Parliament 
varies across policy areas and the policy context conditions the outcomes of EU legislative 
bargaining. Overall, the Parliament is more likely to influence legislation in regulatory 
policy areas. Nevertheless, package deals allow the EP to gain greater influence in some of 
the EU’s most expensive policy areas. Without exaggerating the effect of package deals on 
bicameral decision-making in the EU, the paper identified the specific issue gains the EP 
obtains through package deals. In exchange for supporting the Member States’ budgetary 
policy preferences, the EP secures increased institutional and legislative powers.  
  So long as legislative package deals facilitate the ability of the EU legislature to 
make decisions without sacrificing deliberation or restricting significantly access to the 
decision-making process, they perform a very important function. The EU institutions need 
to carry out their legislative functions effectively within set deadlines. Informal 
negotiations make the legislative process highly flexible. The move to lawmaking through 
package deals in the European Union is the result of the natural and successful adaptation 
of the EU bicameral legislature to its changing political and institutional environments. 
   52
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Appendix I : Descriptive Statistics: Package Deals in the EU (V) 
 
 
Name  Description of variables  Sources  Obs. Min. Max. Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Package Deal  1 = Proposals and issues were decided as a package between the EP and the 
Council; 0 = otherwise 
Statements of EP rapporteurs, 
Council minutes  973 0  1  .251    .434 
Independent variables                 
Legislative Cost Type              
Distributive Proposal (EU 
budget) 
1 = A legislative proposal included a direct reference to the EU financial 
framework; 0 = otherwise  Legislative text  973  0  1  .263  .441 
Distributive Proposal (Member 
States budgets) 
1 = A legislative proposal involved costs to be covered by Member States' 
budgets; 0 = otherwise  Legislative text  973  0  1  .180  .384 
Regulatory Proposal (Private 
Actors) 
1 = A legislative proposal  involved costs to be covered by private actors (and no 
direct costs for EU budget or Member States); 0 = otherwise  Legislative text  973  0  1  .478  .500 
Administrative Proposal  1 = A legislative proposal involved no or insignificant costs and required the 
administrative updating of legal acts; 0 = otherwise  Legislative text  973  0  1   .079  .270 
Urgent   1 = Specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into force; 0 = otherwise  Commission draft, EP Reports  973  0 1 .452 .498 
Council Impatience  
1 =  The Council started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative 
proposal before the EP had done so; 0 = the EP started discussions and 
prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before the Council 
Council Document Register; 
EP Legislative Observatory  973 0  1  .333  .471 
Absolute Preference Distance   Absolute Preference Distance = EP Salience (standardized 1-10) - Council 
Salience (standardized 1-10), regardless of the sign (+ or -) 
Council Document Register; 
EP Reports, Procedural Pages  973 0  9   1.062  1.263 
Parliament - Council Salience 
Tie 
1= Equal preference intensities attached to a proposal by the EP and the Council; 
0 = otherwise 
Council Document Register; 
EP Reports, Procedural Pages  973 0  1  .372  .484 
Party Leaders Involved  1 = Party leaders involved in the negotiations with the Council, in addition to the 
rapporteur 
Council Register; EP 
Procedural pages  973 0  1  .120    .325 
Policy Area Issue Complex  Percentage of legislative proposals per policy area containing two and more 
issues  EP Legislative Observatory  973  14  90  55.062  22.385 
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Appendix II:  Correlations of Variables: Package Deals in the EU (V) 
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Package  Deal  1.000              
Distributive  Proposal  (EU  budget)  0.209  1.000             
Distributive  Proposal  (Member  States  budgets)  -0.049  -0.280  1.000            
Regulatory  Proposal  (Private  Actors)  -0.098  -0.572  -0.448  1.000           
Administrative Proposal  -0.091  -0.175  -0.137  -0.281  1.000         
Urgent  0.137 0.306 -0.076  -0.241  0.055  1.000          
Council  Impatience  0.220 0.009 0.021 -0.012  -  0.021  0.046 1.000        
Absolute  Salience  Distance  0.122 0.100 0.002 -0.088  -0.003 0.071 0.088 1.000      
Parliament - Council Salience Tie  -0.122  -0.083  -0.028  0.085  0.019  -0.059  -0.052  -0.648  1.000     
Party Leaders Involved  0.245  -0.120  0.049  0.089  -0.038  -0.044  0.128  0.164  -0.062  1.000   
Policy  Area  Issue  Complexity  0.286 -0.006  -0.146  0.098 0.036  -0.006  0.211 0.071 -0.077  0.248  1.000   57
Appendix III: Descriptive Statistics: EP Success Across Policy Areas (VIII) 
 
Name  Description of variables  Sources  Obs. Min. Max.  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Success   1 = EP demands included in final Council legislative act; 0 = EP demands NOT 
included in final legislative act 
EP report, amendments, 
Council final text  2369 0  1    .519  .500 
Independent variables              
Package Deal  1 = Proposals and issues were decided as a package between the EP and the 
Council; 0 = otherwise 
Statements of EP rapporteurs, 
Council minutes  2369 0  1  .366  .482 
Co-decision  1 = codecision procedure; 0 = consultation procedure   EP Legislative Observatory  2369  0  1   .661  .473 
Council Impatience  
1 =  The Council started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative 
proposal before the EP had done so; 0 = the EP started discussions and prepared a 
draft text of the legislative proposal before the Council 
Council Document Register; EP 
Legislative Observatory  2369 0  1  .399  .490 
Urgent  1 = Specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into force; 0 = otherwise  Commission draft, EP Reports  2369 0 1 .464 .499 
Urgent for the Commission  1 = Deadline approaching, but no decision taken by European Council in advance; 0 = 
otherwise 
Commission Proposal, Council 
minutes, European Council 
conclusions 
2369
0 1 .186 .389 
European Parliament 
Cohesion 
Percentage of MEPs in the drafting committee voting in favour of the committee report 
(of all committee members present) 
European Parliament Reports: 
Committee votes 
2369 51 100  89.2  13.3 
EP Committee Supported  1 = The EP plenary supports the committee report and no further amendments are 
tabled by MEPs; 0 = Committee report amended or rejected by the Plenary 
European Parliament plenary 
sittings 
2369 0 1 .729 .444 
Relative EP Salience   Relative EP Preference Intensity = EP Salience (standardized 1-10) - Council Salience 
(standardized 1-10), including the direction (+ or -) 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
2369
-8 9  .222 1.963 
EP - Council Salience Tie  1= Equal preference intensities attached to a proposal by the EP and the Council; 0 = 
otherwise 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
2369
0 1 .299 .458 
Commission Support  1 = Commission support for issue contested by the EP; 0 = No Commission support   Commission Statements at EP 
plenary, Communications to EP 
2369 0 1 .520 .500 
Issues Type               
Budgetary Issues  1 = issue budgetary (EU spending, co-financing, funding for specific programmes);  EP report, amendments  2369 0 1 .108 .311 
Policy Substance Issues  1 = issue policy substance (scope of the legislation, clarifications on definitions and 
terms;   EP report, amendments  2369 0 1 .645 .479 
Fundamental Rights Issues  1 = issue fundamental rights (human rights, data protection, asylum, privacy,  
freedoms  EP report, amendments  2369 0 1 .114 .317 
Institutional Powers Issues  1 = issue institutional powers (change of decision-making procedure; reports);   EP report, amendments  2369 0 1 .133 .340 
Distributive Policy Area   Proportion of distributive proposals in a policy area  Legislative text  2369 .170 .943  .413  .208 
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Appendix IV: Correlations of Variables: EP Success Across Policy Areas (VIII) 
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Council  Impatience  0.130  0.207  0.184  1.000            
European  Parliament  Cohesion  0.012  -0.062  -0.134  -0.124  1.000           
EP  Committee  Supported  -0.052  -0.243  -0.283  -0.105  0.349  1.000          
Relative  EP  Salience  -0.067  -0.025  -0.166  -0.133  0.111  0.162  1.000         
Parliament - Council Salience Tie  -0.105  -0.091  -0.129  -0.023  0.015  0.057  -0.074  1.000             
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Distributive  Policy  Area  -0.040 0.014 -0.277 -0.085 0.208 0.160 0.310 -0.085 -0.092 0.191 -0.230 0.028 0.122 1.000 
 
 
 
     